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Introduction  
The recent global financial crises have adversely affected the financial world with the closure of 
more than 160 financial institutions. Consequently, the disparaging series of events (such as Global 
financial crisis 2007/2008 and European debt crisis 2009/2010) have raised serious concerns about 
current financial practices for policymakers and academicians and call for new reforms in the 
financial system or to find alternative medium of conducting financial affairs. In this regard, 
Islamic finance has emerged as an alternative robust system to provide financial intermediation 
services based on mutual risk-sharing without involvement in interest payment and toxic financial 
products. The global Islamic finance industry is increasing in an upward direction witnessed by its 
positive growth rate of 10% over the last 10 years around the globe, with total assets of USD 2.19 
trillion as on 1H2018 (IFSB Report, 2019).  
Being an emerging and quite hot topic in the field of banking and finance, this dissertation deals 
mainly the topics on Islamic finance and follow the structure of three essays for gaining insight to 
the different aspects of Islamic finance such as Islamic banking, Islamic insurance and Bond 
(sukuk), and a viable role this can play in financial development of an economy.  
The first essay is related to the comparative analysis of risk management practices in Islamic and 
Conventional banking and also investigates the impact of the liquidity risk on bank stability. We 
first, investigate the relationship between liquidity and credit risk. Employing a simultaneous 
structural equation approach, on a comprehensive dataset of 52 IBs and CBs, from selected 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation Countries for the period of 2007-2015, a negative relationship 




liquidity risk and stability, finding a negative relationship just for the Islamic banks. We finally 
show that Islamic banks are better than conventional in managing risks. This essay is already 
published in Research in International Buisness and Financa, Volume 48, pages 17-31.  
The second chapter follows a thorough bibliometric review of the literature on Takaful (Islamic 
Insurance). This paper has received the best paper award at ADEIMF annual conference, 
September 13 14, 2019 Turin (Italy). Takaful represents a growing financial segment addressing 
the insurance needs of Islamic societies and economies. We provide a thorough analysis of existing 
contributions on Takaful, by adopting a meta-literature methodology that encompasses both a 
bibliometric (quantitative) and content (qualitative) analysis. By reviewing 65 articles, we aim to 
provide a rigorous background for the Islamic finance industry, its societies and economies, 
academic research and policymakers. We identify and review three leading research streams on 
Takaful: its overview, growth paths and models; governance mechanism; products/services and 
customer perception. Finally, We derive and summarize 16 leading future research questions based 
on meta-literature review.  
The third and final essay is related to the role of trade and financial openness in financial 
development and the real economy through the channel of Islamic banks. This paper has also 
received the Best paper award at 4th IFBBE 2019: Building a Better World Through Inclusion, 
Sustainability and Ethics, 16-17 September Valencia, Spain. In this paper, we analyze the impact 
of trade and financial openness on financial development in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
region by using a comprehensive dataset of 44 Islamic and 48 conventional banks for the period 
of 2007-2015. We find that trade and financial openness have a positive impact on Islamic bank 
profitability but simultaneous openness to both trade and capital markets will reduce the 
profitability of Islamic banks. Moreover, We find that trade and financial openness increase the 
loan volume but reduce the stability of Islamic banks. 
We also conducted a bibliometric review of literature on Sukuk(Islamic bonds) with my supervisor 
and other co-authors of a paper (which is not the part of the thesis). Sukuk (Islamic bonds) is 
one of those Islamic finance sectors that have experienced the fastest growth during the last decade. 
Using a quali-quantitative approach known as meta-literature review, the aim of this paper is to 




through bibliometric citation analysis (using HistCite and VOSviewer software) coupled with 
content analyses. We show the influential aspects of the literature, such as countries, institutions, 
journals, authors, articles and topics. We also present the co-authorship network and identify three 
research streams: (1) Sukuk overview and growth, (2) Sukuk and finance theories, (3) Sukuk and 
stock market behavior. Through the review and analysis of the published research on Sukuk, we 



























































The aim of this paper is to provide a thorough assessment of Islamic banks’ (IBs) liquidity risk 
compared to conventional banks (CBs). We firstly investigate the relationship between liquidity 
and credit risk. Employing a simultaneous structural equation approach, on a comprehensive 
dataset of 52 IBs and CBs, from selected Organization of Islamic Cooperation Countries for the 
period of 2007-2015, we find that credit risk and liquidity risk have negative relationship. We then 
investigate the relationship between liquidity risk and stability, finding a negative relationship just 
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1. Introduction   
One of the crucial and central part of Islamic finance is its banking system i.e. Islamic banks 
(hereafter referred as IBs). Although Islamic banking initially started for Muslims in the Muslim 
populated territories, this concept of banking has widely spread around the world, especially after 
subprime financial crisis. The last couple of decades have observed the development of a number 
of IBs working in different parts of the world. The global Islamic banking industry is increasing 
in an upward direction witnessed by its positive growth of rate of 10% over the last 10 years across 
14 jurisdictions, with a total asset of USD 1.493 trillion as on 1H2016 (IFSB Report, 2017).  
IBs have the same functions of their conventional counterparts even if the nature and structure 
of their products are completely different. It is not allowed for IBs to be involved in transactions 
based on interest (riba), uncertainty (gharar) and speculations/gambling (qimar). The basic 
difference between Islamic and conventional banks is that the former is based on profit and loss 
sharing mode of financing, at least on the liability side of their balance sheet (Obaidullah, 2005).  
Despite being Sharia compliant in their operations, IBs cannot be considered immune to all the 
risks faced by conventional banking system. Among all risks, liquidity and credit risks are the most 
important ones to deal with in the banking sector. Banks usually face credit risk on the asset side 
of their balance sheet, while liquidity risk arises from liability side. If the bank has financed too 
many distressed projects, it is harder for the bank to meet the depositors’ demand. A default on 
loan by the borrower positively contributes to the liquidity risks. Additionally, the bank can face 
“bank run” on its deposits if the economic situation gets worsen, which will ultimately deteriorate 
the values of assets financed by the banks (Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014). Therefore higher credit 
risk results in higher liquidity risks.   
IBs, on the other hand, face liquidity risk in a different way compared to CBs. Firstly, IBs also 
receive deposits on which they have to pay profits. But, due to limited investment venues, IBs find 
it harder to pay the profits and that situation increases the liquidity risk. Secondly, IBs have a very 
limited money market, which makes it harder for IBs to raise funds during shortage of liquidity. 
Moreover, it is a regulatory condition for all banks to keep a statuary reserve in Central Bank, with 
an interest being paid on that amount, but since the interest is not allow under Islamic law, IBs do 
not receive any payment over their reserves. Thereby, IBs are recommended to keep more cash on 




Financial institutions usually face credit risk on the asset side of their balance sheet so as IBs. 
Errico and Farahbaksh (1998) pointed out special risk attached to equity like assets including 
Musharakah and Mudarabah (Ashraf et al. 2016). As in these contracts, relationship of banks with 
their clients is purely based on partnership, thus Islamic bank principally cannot ask collateral to 
hedge this kind of credit risk. Therefore, due to the involvement of moral hazard, asymmetric 
information and having limited expertise in projects involving PLS based contacts, IBs are usually 
reluctant to invest in such projects. On the other hand, liabilities of IBs are also equity-like in 
nature which is mainly based on Mudarabah contract, thus losses would be shared among  the 
bank and depositors and give an extra layer of protection to the IBs.  Even if the current deposits 
are based on Qard-al-Hassana (deposits are considered as interest free loan and has to be pay back 
on demand) and Wadi’ah (IBs act as safe custodian of deposits), these features can exacerbate 
liquidity risk 
There are a lot of studies explaining that IBs are more stable, especially during financial crises 
(Abedifar, et al., 2013;Beck, et al., 2013; Miah and Uddin, 2017), but the reality shows that some 
of them were closed due to liquidity shortage. For example, Ihlas Finans in Turkey started its 
operations in 1995 with the aim to facilitate small investors and savers to park their investments 
on interest free basis. With the asset side of its balance sheet mainly composed of illiquid assets, 
during the banking crisis in Turkey in 2000-2001, Ihlas Finans faced a bank run on its deposits 
resulting in its closure (Ali, 2007).  
The aim of this paper is to offer a comprehensive assessment of liquidity risk in IBs compared 
to CBs. To do this, we firstly examine the relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk and, 
secondly, the impact of liquidity risk on bank stability. We analyze a sample of 26 IBs and 26 CBs 
for the period of 2007 to 2015 from selected Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries. 
We calculate liquidity risk as the difference of all liabilities that can be withdrawn in a very short 
notice from all assets, which can be turned into cash quickly, at low cost, to cover expected and 
unexpected withdrawals. The credit risk is measured by dividing the difference of loan charge off 
and loan recoveries by last year allowance for non-performing loans. 
We find that there is a negative relationship between liquidity and credit risk in IBs. Moreover, 
we find a positive relationship between liquidity risk and bank stability (measured by z-score and 




subprime financial crisis. During financial crisis, we observe negative relationship between 
liquidity risk and bank stability for both, using DD proxy of bank stability, but this relationship 
turns to insignificant for IBs when we add control variables. Lastly, we study the comparative 
performance of IBs and CBs in terms liquidity risk, credit risk and bank stability. We find that IBs 
outperform CBs in managing liquidity and credit risk, but we find some mixed results for stability 
of both banking systems.  
Our study is a value addition to the existing literature on comparative performance of liquidity 
risk, credit risk and stability of Islamic and CBs. Moreover, from a risk management perspective, 
we use more realistic approach, developed by Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014), for calculating our 
main variables, especially for credit risk for which we also take into consideration the effect of 
loan charge offs and loan recoveries. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to 
thoroughly assessing the liquidity risk and its relationship with credit risk in IBs and also the first 
to investigate the impact of liquidity risk on bank stability taking into account both accounting and 
market base measure of bank stability. 
The reminder of the paper is arranged in following chronological order. Section 2 explains the 
literature review and hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the data methodology and 
measurement of variables. Section 4 and 5 explain our main results and robustness checks 
respectively. Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
2. Literature review, theoretical framework and hypothesis foundation  
2.1 Literature review on liquidity risk, credit risk and stability in IBs 
Over the last century, there has been a good number of studies in the literature taking into 
consideration the role of financial institution in an economy, more precisely banks ( Tobin, 1963; 
Gurley and Shaw, 1960; Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Diamond, 1984, among all). 
In the quest of investigating the role of banks, Richard (2015) points out three different theories of 
banking. According to him, the first theory of banking considers banks as institutions that collect 
funds from savers and lend it to the investors. The second theory, which is the reserve theory of 
banking, takes each bank as financial intermediary having no power to create money rather it 




theory of banking rejects the role of bank as financial intermediary and argues that each bank has 
the power to create credit and so new money while extending a new loan.  
All these theories, especially the theory of financial intermediary, implicitly evince that there is 
some relationship between liquidity and credit risk. A growing body of literature, especially after 
subprime financial crisis, emphasizes the positive relationship between these two risks (Allen and 
Carletti, 2008; Cornetta et al., 2011; Gefang et al, 2011; Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014). 
Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) examine the relationship of liquidity and credit risk in US banks 
for the period of 1998-2010. They find a very weak and positive inter relationship of liquidity and 
credit risk using bank specific measures, but they show a very strong and positive relationship in 
terms of bank internal liquidity and bank-external credit risk. Cornetta et al. (2011) argue that 
financial crisis dwindled liquidity from the market. They divide banks into two categories: (1) 
banks, having deposits and equity capital finance as core source of funding, continue to lend more 
as compared to other banks and (2) banks, having more illiquid asset, reduce lending to increase 
their liquidity. Lastly, banks, in managing their liquidity risk, force them to reduce credit supply 
which results in decreasing the credit risk. This also shows co-positive movement of both risks. 
All this literature is more relevant for the mainstream financial system. IBs, on the other hand, 
have very different structure of their operations but they are similar to CBs in their functions. 
Nevertheless, the concept of financial intermediaries has also a well-established record in Islamic 
economic system. Financiers (Sarrafs), execute many transactions in the same way of CBs but in 
an informal way. Udovitch (1981) defines it as ‘Bankers without Banks’. They were involved not 
only in domestic operation but also cross border payment system. It is also evident that such 
financial intermediaries also succor each other to overcome liquidity shortage.  
IBs are working parallel to CBs all around the globe with the same functions to meet the need 
of all its stakeholders but with different contractual structures (Hennie and Iqbal, 2008). Therefore, 
relying on the same literature of CBs, we assume that there is relationship between liquidity risk 
and credit risk in IBs.  
Previous empirical literature on IBs mainly investigates their performance, efficiency, stability 
and risk management individually or in comparison to CBs (How et al., 2005; Olson and Zoubi, 




All of the above literature mainly focuses on the relationship of liquidity or credit risk with 
efficiency and profitability of IBs, or deals only with comparative performance of both risks. The 
only study on this topic (Ghenimi , et al., 2017) analyzes the relationship between liquidity and 
credit risk and their impact on bank stability. They do not find any relationship between liquidity 
and credit risk but both risks individually and jointly effect bank stability. Our paper differs from 
them mainly in three ways. Firstly, we consider both Islamic and conventional banks. Secondly 
we use more comprehensive dataset and taking into account major OIC countries which are 
considered hub of Islamic finance (please see (E&Y, 2016)). Thirdly, we use not only accounting 
base measure of bank stability i.e. Z-score but also market base measure of bank stability i.e. 
Martin distance to default. 
  There is general consensus among the scholars that IBs usually have excessive liquidity due 
to inadequate investment opportunities (Basu et al., 2015; Al-abedallat, 2016). On the liability side 
of the balance sheet, IBs receive deposits based on profit & loss sharing (PLS) on which they have 
to pay profit. On the other hand, they invest those funds on the asset side. Due to limited investment 
opportunities, they have high liquid assets so liquidity risk is very low. Therefore, IBs expose 
themselves to credit risk by extending loans through Murabaha and Ijarah in order to generate 
more profits, but the overall default risk would still be in control. It is not necessary that a bank 
with low liquidity/credit risk controls both risk together as it reflects a very limited overall risk of 
instability (Imbierowicz and Rauch , 2014). Therefore, in both cases of high or low liquidity/credit 
risk in IBs, we expect a negative relationship between them. 
There are several studies analyzing the impact of liquidity risk on bank stability (Wagner, 2007; 
Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Cornetta, et al., 2011; Beck, et al., 2013; Almarzoqi, et al., 2015). Wagner 
(2007) argues that liquidity risk has negative impact on bank stability. Higher liquid assets, 
initially, improve the stability of the bank and make crisis less costly. Consiquently, the bank starts 
taking risk to increase profitability, which offsets the initial positive impact and increase bank 
instability. Cornetta et al. (2011) find that banks, with high illiquid assets, increase their liquidity 
and decrease lending during financial crisis. Almarzoqi et al. (2015) report similar finding while  
Čihák and Hesse (2010) discover no relationship between liquidity risk and stability for larger IBs 




Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) also plays a positive role in the performance of IBs. SSBs 
make sure all the products and contracts to be Sharia compliant and serve the real purpose of 
economic activity concept, thus, do not allow boards of directors and management to involve in 
aggressive poor quality of lending and excessive risk taking behavior. Under such multilayer 
governance structure, Islamic banks are forbidden to create credit against credit due to prohibition 
of interest under Sharia law and are also not allowed to deal in doubtful products such CDOs and 
CDS (Mollah and Zaman, 2015). Additionally, IBs do not create debt with direct lending but 
through the sale or lease of real assets and are better collateralized. These attributes of IBs suggest 
they have low credit risk while, having excess liquidity and low liquidity risk, they opt to increase 
their profitability through consumer lending and borrowing, thus, expect to have negative sign for 
both liquidity and credit risk as reported in table 2. A higher liquidity risk reduces the stability of 
banks especially during bank run. Therefore, based on the above literature and arguments, we 
propose the following hypothesis for our study: 
Hypothesis 1: Liquidity risk and credit risk are interconnected in IBs. 
Hypothesis 2: Liquidity risk is negatively related to credit risk in IBs. 
Hypothesis 3: Liquidity risk and bank stability are interconnected in IBs. 
Hypothesis 4: Liquidity risk is negatively related to bank stability in IBs. 
 
2.2 Literature review on IBs’ performance and risks  
There are several empirical studies comparing the performance of IBs in terms of liquidity risk, 
credit risk and bank stability. Taking a deeper look into the literature, we divide the stream of 
literature into two categories considering the time factor i.e. financial crises.  
Pre-financial crisis period includes studies of Samad (1999) and Al-Jarrah and Molyneux, 
(2007) who find IBs to be more efficient while El-Gamal and Inanoglu (2002) and Bader et al. 
(2008) show no major difference between IBs and CBs in terms of efficiency and productivity. 
Just a few studies show less efficiency for IBs (Abdul-Majid et al., 2010) 
After subprime financial crisis, IBs got the attention of the academics and scholars to investigate 
performance, stability and risk management practices in order to check differences with 
conventional financial system (Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Hasan and Dridi, 2010; Abedifar et al., 




stream of literature found IBs to have lower credit risk, better asset quality and more stable as 
compare to CBs..  
We identify another developing stream of literature which might possibly explain the better 
performance of IBs in terms of credit risk and liquidity risk based on the role of Sharia Supervisory 
Board (SSB). Mollah and Zaman (2015) show a positive relationship between SSB and 
performance of IBs and consider it as key feature of governance for IBs. SSB make sure that 
Islamic banking product does not involve any interest (riba), excessive risk/ speculation (gharar) 
and based on real economic activity to maintain social justice in the society (Beck et al., 2013). 
Choudhury and Hoque (2006) call SSB in IBs a “Supra Authority”. That is why IBs have been 
never exposed to toxic or mortgage back securities. Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and 
credit derivative swap (CDS) are not allowed as they are forbidden by Islamic law (Ahmed, 2009).  
A few studies also consider the role of customers’ religious belief in better performance of IBs 
such as (Loo, 2010; Baele et al., 2014) and suggest that Islamic bank’s customers are better in 
honoring their commitments and more loyal. 
 According to the above literature and reasoning, IBs have better quality of assets, are well-
capitalized and have better governance structure. Therefore, we expect IBs to have better 
management of liquidity risk and credit risk than CBs, thus proposing the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: IBs manage liquidity risk better than CBs. 
   Hypothesis 6: IBs manage credit risk better and are more stable than CBs. 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data Sample selection  
We collect data from Bloomberg Professional Service and using individual financial statements 
publicly available at respective bank website for the period 2007-2015.  
For the purpose of this study, we initially select 40 banks of each banking sector (i.e. Islamic 
and conventional banking) from selected OIC countries which are arguably considered the hub of 
Islamic finance. All these countries meet the basic condition, i.e. both types of banks coexist. Data 
for CBs are easily available either using Bloomberg database or publicly available financial 
statements. But, we reduce the dataset to 26 banks from each sector due to data unavailability from 




cross checked with “The Banker Special report” (November, 2015) and respective country Central 
Bank. We maintain the same number of banks for both banking sector in order to give the same 
playing field for the purpose of this study.  
 
Table 1. Sample 
Country Name  Initial Papulation    Sample Dataset    
  IBs  CBs Total IBs  CBs Total  
Bahrain 5 5 10 5 5 10 
Bangladesh 4 4 8 0 0 0 
Indonesia  3 3 6 1 1 2 
Kuwait 4 4 8 3 3 6 
Malaysia 4 4 8 4 4 8 
Pakistan 4 4 8 2 2 4 
Qatar 4 4 8 3 3 6 
Saudi Arabia 5 5 10 3 3 6 
Turkey 3 3 6 2 2 4 
United Arab 
Emirates  4 4 8 3 3 6 
Total 40 40 80 26 26 52 
This table contains bank population and sample data set and classify country list and bank 
type. As observed from the table, initially there were total 80 banks which reduced to 52 due 
to unavailability of data especially for IBs not only at Bloomberg but also some banks do not 
have publically available archive of their financial statements. 
  
3.2 Selection of Variables  
We select two main risk factors for this study i.e. liquidity risk and credit risk. There are many 
studies (Kim and Sohn, 2017; Saeed and Izzeldin, 2016; Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014) which use 




Following the literature on bank stability, we select two proxy variables for bank stability. First, 
we apply accounting based measure i.e. Z-score as proxy of bank stability in order to check the 
impact of liquidity risk on bank stability. Z-score is arguably a well-established measure of bank 
stability among scholars and practitioners (Čihák and Hesse, 2010: Beck et al., 2013). Despite of 
its popularity, Čihák and Hesse (2010) find a possible drawback espacially when its used to 
measure stability of IBs. Having the feature of PLS at least on the liability side, it may undervalue 
the stability of the bank. 
To account for this issue, we apply a market based measure of bank stability. Market based 
measure is considered better in predicting a bank failure than the accounting one. Therefore, we 
also use Merton’s Distance to Default (DD) as market based proxy of measuring bank stability 
(Kabir et al., 2015).  
 
3.3 Measurement of Variables  
3.3.1 Measurement of Liquidity Risk and Credit Risk 
Following the study of Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014), the variable for liquidity risk is the 
difference of all liabilities which can be withdrawn on a very short notice from all assets, that can 
be turned into cash quickly at low cost to cover expected and unexpected withdrawals and 
standardized by total assets. A positive value shows that the bank does not have enough liquid 
assets to meet its short term liabilities. Therefore, a bank has to tap other sources in order to avoid 
classical bank run which can further increase the default risk of the bank. On the contrary, a 
negative value shows that the bank has more liquid assets compared to short-term liabilities so it 
can meet all its obligation. 
The credit risk is measured by dividing the difference of loan charge off and loan recoveries by 
last year allowance for non-performing loans. This ratio explains the ability of the bank to manage 
its loans. If the ratio is more than 1, the bank has more loan losses and need to revise its credit risk 








3.3.2 Measurement of Z-score and Distance to Default 
  The Z-score is the sum of return on asset (ROA) and equity to asset ratio (EAR) divided by 
standard deviation of ROA. It is inversely related to bank insolvency: the higher/(lower) the value 
of z-score, the lower/(higher) is the probability that bank will go into insolvency. 
DD is the difference of assets’ market value of and default point, divided by the product of assets’ 
market value and volatility of assets. We collect all the data of default probability (DP) from 
Bloomberg Professional Services. We, then, estimate DD by inverse comulative distribution 
function of default probability.  
Let 𝐷𝐷 a standard normal variable, where  𝐷𝐷 ~𝑁(0,1) . The probability of default ( 𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) 
is 𝐶𝐷𝐹(−𝐷𝐷): 









  𝑑𝑡 




[1 + 𝑒𝑟𝑓 (
𝐷𝐷
√2
)]                         [1] 
Equation 1 also works in reverse, if we have probability of default ( 𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) by inverse of the 
cumulative distribution function we can define DD. 
ɸ−1(𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) = √2 𝑒𝑟𝑓










Table 2 Main variables and expected signs 
Variable Name Notation Source Expected Sign 
Bank Risk Specific Variable 
Liquidity Risk LR 
Author’s calculation using data from  Bloomberg and 
individual bank financial statements 
Negative 
Credit Risk CR 
Author’s calculation using data from Bloomberg and 
individual bank financial statements 
Negative 
Bank stability Variable 
Z-score Z-score 
Author’s calculation using data from  Bloomberg and 




DD Author’s calculation using Bloomberg data. Negative 
This table explain the expected sign of the main variables. For bank risk variables, we expect to have 
negative sign for both liquidity and credit risk.  For bank stability variables, we expect to have negative 















Table 3. Description of main variables 
Variable 
Name  
Estimation  interpretation  
  CBs IBs   
Liquidity 
Risk   
{(Demand deposits +transection deposits 
+Brokered deposits + NOW accounts + 
Contingent liabilities within one year )-
(Cash + currency & coins +trading assets 
+ Fed fund purchased+ commercial 
paper+ Securities available for sale)) ± 
Net interbank lending position ) ± Net 
derivatives position}/Total Assets   
(Demand Deposit 
(Amanah)+ Investment 




Contingent liabilities within 
one year)-(Cash +currency 
& coins + trading assets+ 
reserve with central bank + 
Securities available for sale) 
± Net interbank lending 
position ± Net derivative 
position)}/Total Assets 
LR > 0 
implies that 
the bank is 











   
Credit Risk  
  

















(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡) 














 the bank is 
more stable. 
This table explains the estimation of main variables and its interpretation. 
 
 
3.3.3 Control Variables  
Moreover, we also consider some control variables which possibly can influence the main 
variables of this study and also elucidate the general position of the bank. These include return on 
assets (ROA), efficiency ratio (ER), and asset growth (AG), loan growth (AG) as bank-specific 
variables, and GDP as macroeconomic variable as well recognized by the literature (see Abedifar, 
et al., 2013, Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014). Table 4 explains all the control variables used for this 
study and their estimation. 
Table 4 Description of control variables 
Control Variables Unit  Estimation Method 
Return on Asset 
(ROA) 
% 




(Operating Expenses/Total Revenue)*100 
 










Growth rate of Gross domestic product (downloaded from WDI 
Website) of the countries selected for this study 
This Table explains all the control variable used for this study and their estimation. 
 
3.4 Methodology  
This study follows the three-stage process. Firstly, we divide the data into two categories, i.e. 
subprime financial crisis and post financial crisis period. For the former, we use the time period 
from 2007 to 2008 while post financial crisis covers 2009-2015 period. Furthermore, we first run 
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𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡  −  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1




the analysis for all banks merging both Islamic and CBs to check pattern of relationship between 
LR and CR. We then separately run the analysis for both banking system which is one of the main 
objective of this study. 
At first, the direction of relationship between LR and CR is not pronounced at the beginning. 
To account for this problem, we used structural equation approach through 3 stage least squares 
method as used by (Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014) and (Mollah and Zaman, 2015). 
𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐿𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡            [3]            
𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐿𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡           [4]           
These equations are run simultaneously controlling the problem of endogeneity of the 
respective independent variable and to check the contemporaneous effect and influence of 
independent variable on dependent variable. We apply the unit root Dicky fuller GLS test on the 
relevant dependent variables which was rejected. As mentioned earlier, we additionally include 
return on asset (ROA), efficiency ratio (ER), asset growth (AG), loan growth (LG) and gross 
domestic product growth (GDP) as control variables. 
Secondly, we run the simultaneous equations using again 3 stage least square method, following 
the same pattern as in the previous section, taking into account financial crisis factor and bank type 
to test the relationship of liquidity risk with bank stability, using following equations: 
𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖.𝑡         [5] 
𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖.𝑡         [6] 
 
𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖.𝑡                     [7] 
𝐿𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐴𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖.𝑡                     [8] 
    Lastly, we use Mann-Whitney U test along with mean value from descriptive statistic as 
followed by (Hassan et al., 2009) in order to compare the performance of IBs with respect to its 










4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5 explains the descriptive results of all banks. We include the dataset of 52 banks (with 
the exception of DD analysis where we use 30 banks due to unavailability of data) subdivided 
simultaneously based on two factors, i.e. categories of banks and incorporating the financial crisis 
period. Our main objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between liquidity risk 
and credit risk in IBs in comparison to conventional ones and how LR influences bank stability, 
but to see the direction of relationship, we also run analysis for all banks. 
 





Financial  crisis period   Post financial crisis period 













104 104 100 60  364 364 362 210 
 Minimum -0.9205 -6.379 0.5679 2.037  -0.498 -11.39 -0.0919 1.93 
 Maximum  1.54 1.974 8.485 3.68  1.87 5.09 6.045 3.84 
 Mean 0.17349 -0.0927 3.865 3.08  0.221 0.1773 3.777 3.204 
 S.D  0.359 1.061 1.366 0.283 
 





52 52 51 30 
 
182 182 181 105 
 
 Minimum -0.26 -2.08 0.567 2.55  -0.35 -2 2.459 2.394 
 Maximum  1.54 1.45 8.485 3.44  1.87 5.09 5.566 3.77 
 Mean 0.2716 0.0597 3.914 3.035  0.2874 0.273 4.152 3.216 
 S.D  0.344 0.639 1.4246 0.232 
 





52 52 49 30  182 182 181 105 
 Minimum -0.92 -6.38 1.92 2.037 
 
-0.49 -11.4 -0.0919 1.93 
 Maximum  0.87 1.97 6.839 3.68 
 




 Mean 0.0756 -0.2451 3.815 3.141 
 
0.155 0.0815 3.4 3.191 
 S.D 0.351 1.348 1.316 0.3228  0.245 1.31 1.195 0.344 
 
This table explains the descriptive statistics of main variables for all categories of banks and subdivided 
period of financial crisis and post financial crisis. 
 
  For all banks, the mean value of LR is 0.1734 and CR is -0.0927 during financial crisis period 
which implies high liquidity risk and low credit risk while the z-score is 3.865 and DD is 3.08. But 
the intensity of both risk increases to 0.221 and 0.1773 for LR and CR respectively during the post 
financial crisis with the decrease in z-score also to 3.777 but DD value increases. The LR and CR 
is 0.2716 and 0.0597 respectively for CBs with z-score 3.914 and DD 3.035 during financial crisis 
period. LR slightly increases but CR intensively increases to 0.273 during post financial crisis, 
with z-score at 4.152 and DD value 3.216. This implies that the impact of LR is greater, in terms 
of profitability, than CR, resulting in more stability for CBs. The results of IBs are more 
pronounced. IBs have the value of LR 0.0756 and CR -0.2451 during financial crisis, which is 
better compared to CBs. But, CBs are slightly more stable compared to IBs. We find the same 
pattern of increase for IBs during post financial crisis period. The contrasting results of z-score 
and DD suggest the careful selection of methodology for assessing the stability of the banks.  
It could be due to aftershocks of financial crisis, but it has not as much material impact on 
Middle East economies as on Western economies. Plausible major reason of this increase in LR 
and CR would be due to real estate crisis in Middle East countries especially in UAE started late 
2008 and early 2009. 
 
4.2 The relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in terms of bank type. 
The structure of the products used by IBs is different compared to CBs, so it is likely that LR 
and CR have different patterns of relationship in terms of bank type. During the financial crisis 
period, we do not find any statistically significant relationship between LR and CR neither as LR 
(dependent variable) and CR (independent variable) nor in vice versa case for CBs, but we find 
negative relationship between LR and CR after adding control variables for IBs. Our results are 
partially supported by the findings of (Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014) as they also don’t provide 




However, we find statistically significant negative reciprocal relationship between CR and LR for 
both CBs and IBs in post financial crisis period. The results are reported in table 6 and 7. 
The main sources of funding for banks are the deposits that they receive on the liability side of 
their balance sheet. They channelize and park all the deposits using available sources on the asset 
side of the balance sheet. LR together with CR results in default risk or bankruptcy of the bank. 
The risk manager sets the tolerable level of default risk. If the credit risk is already high, the bank 
will reduce liquidity risk by investing in low yield highly marketable securities in order to keep 
tolerable level of default risk. But, if the credit risk is low, the bank has a cushion and can increase 
liquidity risk by investing in less liquid relatively high yield securities at same level of tolerable 
default risk. Moreover, this negative relationship in IBs could also be due to extra Sharia 
monitoring on the part of Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) which reduces credit risk (Mollah and 
Zaman, 2015) and attitude of Islamic banking customers who timely honor their commitments 
(Baele et al., 2014). Our results are consistent with the findings of Ghenimi , et al., (2017). These 
















Table 6 Liquidity and credit risk relationship: simultaneous equation 
 
Credit risk and liquidity risk relationship 
Regression Analysis- Simultaneous Equation 
    Financial Crisis period    Post Financial Crisis period  
LR-All Banks       
 CR .01557 .0035586  -.0004391 -.0182085 
 ROA   -.0259351   .0031126 
 ER  .0000202   .0004388 
 LG  -.0001733     -.0013168 
 AG  -.0009531   -.0020132 
 GDP  -.0098552   -.0027282 
LR-CBs       
 CR -.08474 -.0943867  -.12004*** -.10351*** 
 ROA   -.0393465   -.0382778 
 ER  -.0000896   .004608** 
 LG  -.0058036   .00707** 
 AG  .0048486   .0002108 
 GDP  .0013975   .0085246 
LR-IBs       
 CR -.04951 -.0554278*  -.03405* -.040985** 
 ROA   -.048632*   .000242 
 ER  -.002057   -.00064 
 LG  .000085   -.00094 
 AG  -.000168   .00115 
 GDP  .001208   -.0020 
The table show the result of regression analysis by simultaneous equation through  3-stage least square 
for the period of 2007 to 2015 which is further divided into financial crisis period(2007-2008) and post 
financial crisis period (2009-2015).Moreover, ROA, efficiency ratio(ER), loan growth (LG), asset 
growth (AG) and GDP are the control variables.  
*** indicates the statistical significance at 1%.  
** indicates the statistical significance at 5%.  




Table 7 Liquidity and credit risk relationship: simultaneous equation 
Credit risk and liquidity risk relationship 
Regression Analysis- Simultaneous Equation 
    Financial Crisis period    Post Financial Crisis period  
CR-All Banks       
 LR .114252 .0274149  -.0038922 -.064291 
 ROA   -.019583   .0356124   
 ER  -.0000867     -.0011355 
 LG  -.0009117     -.004015 
 AG  .0012247   -.0114775 ** 
 GDP  -.0305276   -.008821 
CR-CBs       
 LR -.29155 -.3196586  -.6535512*** -.6229174*** 
 ROA   -.034689   .0076098 
 ER  -.0001741   -.0014498 
 LG  -.0079205   .0082339 
 AG  .0039991   -.0146671 
 GDP  -.0320682   -.0085305 
CR-IBs       
 LR -.72972 -.85456*  -.97140* -1.1120** 
 ROA   -.05952   .0202 
 ER  -.01088   -.0014 
 LG  -.00252   -.0064 
 AG  .00761   -.0084 
 GDP  -.042908   -.0082 
The table show the result of regression analysis by simultaneous equation through  3-stage least square 
for the period of 2007 to 2015 which is further divided into financial crisis period(2007-2008) and post 
financial crisis period (2009-2015). Moreover, ROA, efficiency ratio(ER), loan growth (LG), asset 
growth (AG) and GDP are the control variables.  
*** indicates the statistical significance at 1%. 
  ** indicates the statistical significance at 5%.  





4.3 The relationship between liquidity risk and bank stability 
Following the same pattern as in the previous section, we run the simultaneous equations using 
3 stage least square method for the period of 2007 to 2015, subdivided into financial crisis from 
2007 to 2008 and post financial crisis period from 2009 to 2015, taking into account the bank type. 
We report all the results in tables 8, 9, 10 and 11. 
It is very important for IBs to ensure its stability as they are exposed to different risks as compare 
to CBs. In addition to normal business risks, IBs also face commercial/withdrawal and reputational 
risks. IBs maintain profit equalization reserves (IFSB-1, 2005) to mitigate withdrawal risk. They 
are more prudent to maintain its stability as they are exposed to reputational risk which can 
deteriorate the trust of investors, depositors and eventually can lead to bank run and insolvency. 
Therefore, we may observe different results for IBs as compare to CBs   
During the financial crisis period, we find statistically significant positive relationship between 
liquidity risk and bank stability for CBs, using z-score, while we observe negative relations when 
DD is used as proxy of bank stability. On the other hand, post financial crisis period shows a 
statistically significant positive relationship of LR and bank stability. This could be due to the fact 
that CBs have more market share in countries under investigation  resulting in higher profitability 
which is one of the main determinants of bank stability (see E&Y, 2016; Beck, et al., 2013; Čihák 
and Hesse, 2010).  
For IBs, we find statistically significant negative relationship between LR and bank stability, 
using z-score, both in financial and post financial crisis periods, implying that higher liquidity risk 
reduces the bank stability. We find similar results for LR and bank stability during the post 
financial crisis period, using the proxy variable DD. There are possibly two reasons. First of all, 
IBs generally hold higher liquidity (lower liquidity risk), that improves the stability of the bank. 
To enjoy more profitability, IBs are mainly dependent on investment in illiquid assets which 
increase the liquidity risk and decrease the stability of banks especially during crisis, as happened 
in failure case of Ihlas Finans (Ali, 2007). It is not necessary that ROA always positively 
contributes to bank stability as observed during financial crisis, using Z-score, for IBs. If 




which results in higher volatility of ROA, thereby, leading to decrease in bank stability (Ibrahim 
and Rizvi, 2017). 
Table 8 Z-score and liquidity risk relationship: simultaneous equation 
Z-Score and Liquidity risk Relationship  
Regression Analysis-Simultaneous Equation  
    
Financial crisis period  
Post financial crisis 
period 
Z-Score-All Banks       
 LR -0.5601 -0.9426**  0.6417*** 0.4748*** 
 ROA  -0.1982**   0.4062*** 
 ER  -0.0127***   -0.0046*** 
 LG  -0.0024   -0.0074** 
 AG  0.0142**   0.0011 
 GDP  0.0344   -0.0006 
Z-Score-CBs       
 LR 1.2228*** 1.4887***  0.6853*** 1.2105*** 
 ROA  0.2231   0.4854*** 
 ER  -0.0056   -0.0167*** 
 LG  0.0340**   -0.0168*** 
 AG  -0.0003   0.0034 
 GDP  -0.0148   -0.0029 
Z-Score-IBs       
 LR -2.4309*** -2.9643***  -1.0431*** -1.3955*** 
 ROA  -0.4602***   0.3206*** 
 ER  -0.0092   -0.0053*** 
 LG  -0.0008   -0.0067 
 AG  0.0095   0.0059 
 GDP  0.1057***   -0.0064 
This table show the relationship of liquidity risk with  stability of the bank, using Z-score as bank stability 
for the period of 2007-2015 subdivided into financial crisis period (2007-2008) and post financial crisis 
period (2009-2015), using the 3stage least square simultaneous equations. Moreover, return on asset 




*** indicates the statistical significance at 1%.  
** indicates the statistical significance at 5%.  
*  indicates the statistical significance at 10% 
Table 9 Z-score and liquidity risk relationship: simultaneous equation 
Z-Score and Liquidity risk Relationship  
Regression Analysis- Simultaneous Equations  
    Financial crisis period   Post financial crisis period 
LR-All Banks       
 Z-Score -0.0372 -0.0568**  0.0518*** 0.0565*** 
 ROA  -0.092***   -0.0242 
 ER  -0.004***   -0.0003 
 LG  0.0001   0.0004 
 AG  0.0001   0.0009 
 GDP  0.0098   0.0040 
LR-CBs       
 Z-Score 0.0725*** 0.1123***  0.1239*** 0.3067*** 
 ROA  -0.0925**   -0.1748*** 
 ER  -0.0015   0.0083*** 
 LG  -0.0065*   0.0092*** 
 AG  0.0025   0.0003 
 GDP  0.0091   0.0072 
LR-IBs       
 Z-Score -0.163*** -0.183***  -0.0435*** -0.0734*** 
 ROA  -0.119***   0.0230 
 ER  -0.0044**   -0.0009** 
 LG  -0.0002   -0.0011 
 AG  0.0020   0.0018 
 GDP  0.0175*   -0.0021 
This table show the impact of liquidity risk on the stability of the bank, using Z-score as bank stability,  




period (2009-2015), using 3stage least square simultaneous equations. Moreover, return on asset (ROA), 
efficiency ratio(ER), loan growth (LG) and asset growth (AG) are the control variables.  
*** indicates the statistical significance at 1%.  
** indicates the statistical significance at 5%.  
*  indicates the statistical significance at 10% 
Table 10 Distant to Default (DD) and liquidity risk relationship: simultaneous equation 
DOD and Liquidity risk Relationship  
Regression Analysis- Simultaneous Equation 
    Financial crisis period   Post financial crisis period 
DD-All Banks       
 LR -0.276*** -0.1926*  0.0312 -0.0630 
 ROA  -0.0006   0.040*** 
 ER  0.0001   -0.0019*** 
 LG  -0.0005   0.0007 
 AG  0.0021   0.0040** 
 GDP  0.0145**   0.0092** 
DD-CBs       
 LR -0.1061 -0.3010*  0.3365*** 0.2165*** 
 ROA  -0.0553   -0.0764*** 
 ER  -0.0001   -0.0087*** 
 LG  -0.0044   0.0001 
 AG  0.0079**   0.0030 
 GDP  0.0108   0.0060 
DD-IBs       
 LR -0.2849** -0.0441  -0.4014*** -0.3871*** 
 ROA  0.0440   0.1112*** 
 ER  -0.0005   -0.0012** 
 LG  -0.0013   0.0011 
 AG  -0.0008   0.0028 




This table show the impact of liquidity risk on the stability of the bank, using Distance to default as bank 
stability,  for the period of 2007-2015 subdivided into financial crisis period (2007-2008) and post 
financial crisis period (2009-2015), using 3stage least square simultaneous equations. Moreover, return 
on asset (ROA), efficiency ratio(ER), loan growth (LG) and asset growth (AG) are the control variables.  
*** indicates the statistical significance at 1%.  
** indicates the statistical significance at 5%.  
*  indicates the statistical significance at 10% 
Table 11 Distant to Default (DD) and liquidity risk relationship: simultaneous equation 
DD and Liquidity risk Relationship  
Regression Analysis- Simultaneous Equations 
    Financial crisis period   Post financial crisis period 
LR-All Banks       
 DD -0.3972*** -0.2582*  0.0213 -0.0540 
 ROA  -0.089***   -0.0158 
 ER  -0.0003   -0.0007 
 LG  0.0001   -0.0002 
 AG  -0.0002   0.0029 
 GDP  0.0155*   0.0043 
LR-CBs       
 DD -0.1403 -0.3621*  0.3856*** 0.3575*** 
 ROA  -0.093***   -0.0095 
 ER  -0.0003   0.0055** 
 LG  -0.0024   0.0023 
 AG  -0.0016   0.0004 





LR-IBs       
 DD -0.4273** -0.0552  -0.1743*** -0.3075*** 
 ROA  -0.1165**   0.0192 
 ER  -0.0070**   -0.0009** 




 AG  0.0047   0.0044** 
 GDP  -0.0102   -0.0016 
This table show the impact of liquidity risk on the stability of the bank, using Distance to Default as bank 
stability,  for the period of 2007-2015 subdivided into financial crisis period (2007-2008) and post 
financial crisis period (2009-2015), using 3stage least square simultaneous equations. Moreover, return 
on asset (ROA), efficiency ratio(ER), loan growth (LG) and asset growth (AG) are the control variables.  
*** indicates the statistical significance at 1%.  
** indicates the statistical significance at 5%.  
*  indicates the statistical significance at 10% 
 
4.4 Comparison of liquidity risk management 
In this section, we check the performance of both banking system in order to verify which is 
better in managing their liquidity. We could do it only by mean comparison but it does not satisfy 
our purpose of testing the hypothesis. To account for this problem, we employ the Mann-Whitney 
U test which is a relevant test for such kind of data of two independent samples having same 
distribution. We report the results in Table 12.  
We provide evidence that IBs perform significantly better as compared to its counterpart during 
both phases of sample period. Table 12 shows that the mean and mean rank value of LR for IBs is 
0.0756 and 43.26 which is pretty much lower than the CBs. These results are statistically 
significant at p-value of 5% during financial crisis period and 1% during the period of post 
financial crisis and support our hypothesis 3 which says that IBs are better in managing their 
liquidity risk. Practitioners and academic scholars unanimously agree on the point that IBs have 
relatively less investment opportunities in order to maintain extra checks for the safe parking of 
their deposits. Thus, IBs normally have excess liquidity in terms of cash holdings, which can lead 
to commercial risk due to the difference of return rate between IBs and CBs. In CBs, the rate of 
return is ex ante and fixed whereas, the rate of return in IBs is based on PLS (profit & loss sharing) 
and ex post. To maintain competitive rate of return, they use the smoothing income approach as 
required by IFSB (IFSB-1, 2005). The commonly used methods of smoothing income are profit 
equalization reserves (PER) and the investment risk reserves (IRR), which allow IBs to stabilize 
and make their rate of return as competitive as in conventional banking to mitigate the commercial 





4.5 Comparison of credit risk management and bank stability 
In order to check the performance of credit risk management and bank stability between both 
banking systems, we follow the same pattern and methodology as applied in previous section for 
liquidity risk management. We do not find any statistical significance pattern between CBs and 
IBs in terms of credit risk management during both, financial crisis and post financial crisis period 
but it does not mean that our results have no economic meaning. Results are reported in table 12. 
Comparing the mean values, we find better credit risk management in IBs having the value of 
CR -0.2451 and 0.0783 in financial crisis and post financial crisis period respectively which is 
better as compared to CBs. The lower value of CR implies lower loan losses and vice versa. There 
could be several reasons of this better performance but three of them are worth mentioning here. 
Firstly, IBs do not deal only in documents but also in goods and use money as a tool of exchange 
rather dealing in money which is common in CBs (Ayub, 2009). IBs strictly make sure the 
underlying asset that makes the transaction related to the real economic activity. Secondly, the 
structure of the products is entirely different in IBs compared to their counterparts. IBs do not 
generally extend loan in the form of hard cash to their customers. Lastly, all financial institutions 
dealing in loans charge penalty in case of late payment, and in similar way IBs act. But, there is 
fundamental difference between such penalties. In Islamic finance, the impact of this charge is 
positive for society. Instead of making it part of their profit, as in CBs, IBs create charity account 
and spend that charity for the welfare of society, keeping it separate from their CSR (corporate 
social responsibility) activities. 
Regarding bank stability, as reported in table 12, we do not find any statistical significant 
difference during financial crisis but the higher mean value of z-score 3.914 implies that CBs are 
more stable. Additionally, we find CBs to be more stable at statistically significant p-value of 1% 
during post financial crisis with higher z-score of 4.152.  
Using market based measure DD, we find IBs to be more stable during financial crisis at p-
value 5%, while we do not find any statistical difference between both banking systems during 
post financial crisis. But higher DD mean value of 3.216 suggests that CBs are more stable. There 
might be several reasons, but some points are worth mentioning here. Firstly, IBs have very limited 




market share of 51.2% (see E&Y report, 2016). Secondly, IBs, with limited investment 
opportunities, have generally excess liquidity which ultimately reduces their profitabality, thus 
negatively affecting their stability. Our contrasting results of banks’ stability, using accounting 
and market based measures, are partially in line with the findings of Kabir et al. (2015) and suggest 
to emphasize more on the idenification of specific methodology in assessing banks’ stability. 
 
Table 12 Performance Comparison of Liquidity risk, credit risk and bank stability 




LR-IBs Observation 52 182   
 Mean 0.0756** 0.157***   
 Mean Rank 43.26** 160.32***   




52 182   
 Mean 0.2716 0.2874   
 Mean Rank 61.73 204.67   
 Sum of Ranks 3210 37250.5   
CR-IBs Observation 52 182   
 Mean -0.2451 0.0783   
 Mean Rank 49.08 174.13   
 Sum of Ranks 2552 31691   
      
CR-CBs Observation 52 182   
 Mean 0.0597 0.273   
 Mean Rank 55.92 190.87   
 Sum of Ranks 2908 34739   
Stability-
IBs 
 Financial Crises Post Financial Crisis 
  Z-score DD Z-score DD 
 Observation 50 30 182 105 




 Mean Rank 48.82 34.9** 146.97 104.48 
 Sum of Ranks 2441 1047 26749 10970 
Stability-
CBs  
Observation 51 30 182 105 
 Mean 3.914 3.035 4.152*** 3.216 
 Mean Rank 53.14 26.1 218.03*** 106.52 
 Sum of Ranks 2710 783 39681 11185 
This table explain the performance of both CBs and IBs in terms of liquidity risk, credit risk and 
bank stability. Again we subdivided the time period into financial crisis period from2007 to 2008 
and post financial crisis period from 2009 to 2015. We applied Mann-Whitney U test in order to 
check the performance and test the relevant hypothesis. 
*** indicates the statistical significance at 1%.   
  ** indicates the statistical significance at 5%.    

















5. Robustness checks. 
We follow two stage robustness checks. Firstly, we eliminate the GDP from our control 
variables in order to check the relationship between bank specific variables. Secondly, we apply 
random effect GLS approach (Mollah and Zaman, 2015) to further check the validity of our results. 
This method is used if the differences across different variables have influence on the dependent 
variable. Furthermore, we also perform same task using the robust standard error (Beck et al, 2013) 
for which the tables are not reported due to brevity of space. As expected, the results of these 
robustness tests further validate our main findings that there is negative relationship between 
liquidity risk and credit risk. 
Table 13 GLS Random effect 
Liquidity risk and credit risk relationship 
Regression Analysis- GLS 
  Financial crisis period  Post financial crisis period 
LR-All Banks       
 CR 0.01557 0.00840  -0.00044 -0.00736 
 ROA  -0.03617   0.001232 
 ER  -7.12E-06   0.000473 
 LG  -5.2E-05   -0.00135 
 AG  -0.0011   -0.00213 
LR-CBs       
 CR -0.0654 -0.07145  -0.1116 *** -0.106 *** 
 ROA  -0.02136   -0.0341 
 ER  1.54E-05   .00416** 
 LG  -0.00524   .00782*** 
 AG  0.004913   0.00020 
LR-IBs       
 CR -0.0495 -.055880*  -.03405* -.04087** 
 ROA  -.047266*   -0.00144 
 ER  -0.00211   -0.00062 
 LG  0.000073   -0.0009 




The table show the result of regression analysis using GLS for the period of 2007 to 2015 which is further 
divided into financial crisis period (2007-2008) and post financial crisis period (2009-2015).Moreover, 
ROA, efficiency ratio(ER), loan growth (LG) and asset growth (AG) are the control variables.  
*** indicates the statistical significance at 1%.  
** indicates the statistical significance at 5%.  
*   indicates the statistical significance at 10% 
 
Table 14 GLS Random effect 
Credit risk and liquidity risk relationship 
Regression Analysis- GLS 
    Financial crisis period    Post financial crisis period  
CR-All Banks       
 LR .098970 .0711016  .00911 -.03334 
 ROA   -.0438436   .0440 
 ER  -.0002103   -.0016 
 LG  .00021   -.0031 
 AG  -.0017318   -.0080 
CR-CBs       
 LR -.25896 -.2963255  -.5823*** -.6306*** 
 ROA   -.0112075   -.6306 
 ER  -.0000602   -.0008 
 LG  -.0043653   .0075 
 AG  -.0032616   -.0144 
CR-IBs       
 LR -.4231 -.5326  -.6029* -.7713** 
 ROA   -.1011   .0188 
 ER  -.0008   -.0009 
 LG  .0008   -.0053 




The table show the result of regression analysis using GLS for the period of 2007 to 2015 which is further 
divided into financial crisis period (2007-2008) and post financial crisis period (2009-2015).Moreover, 
ROA, efficiency ratio(ER), loan growth (LG), asset growth (AG) and GDP are the control variables.  
*** indicates the statistical significance at 1%. 
  ** indicates the statistical significance at 5%.  
    * indicates the statistical significance at 10% 
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
Liquidity and credit risks are the most important types of banking risks. We investigate the 
relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in IBs. Moreover, we examine the impact of 
liquidity risk on bank stability and also compare the performance of IBs and CBs with respect to 
liquidity, credit risk and bank stability. We find a negative relationship of liquidity and credit risk 
during financial crisis period for IBs but find negative relationship between liquidity and credit 
risk during post financial crisis not only in IBs but also in CBs. This relationship could be due to 
high or low credit/liquidity risk in banks.  
On the other hand, the negative relationship of these risks in IBs could also be due to governance 
mechanism and Islamic banking customer’s behavior. IBs have multi-layer governance structure 
including Sharia Supervisory Board that makes sure all the activities to be compliant with Sharia.  
Moreover, we find a positive relationship between liquidity risk and bank stability for CBs 
during post financial crisis period, while IBs have negative relationship between liquidity risk and 
stability both during financial crisis and post financial crisis periods using z-score. But, after 
employing the DOD variable as a measure of bank stability, we find this negative relationship only 
in post financial crisis period. IBs generally have lower liquidity risk resulting in higher stability 
of the IBs. Lower liquidity risk might initially improves the stability, but the bank management 
will start taking risk, to increase profitability, which offsets the initial positive impact and increases 
bank instability. Additionally, we also find that IBs performance are better compared to CBs in 
terms of both, credit and liquidity risk while CBs are found to be more stable. We perform some 
robustness tests using different method which further supported our results. 
Our results have several implications. There is great amount of theoretical and empirical 
literature dealing with the theoretical and practical aspects of IBs but very limited studies focus on 




and study such relationship in IBs, so this study has value additive contribution to very limited 
existing literature in this field.  
In addition, study also has some recommendation for risk managers in banks and regulators. 
The risk management unit of the bank should jointly work not only to minimize the default risk 
but also enhance the overall performance of the bank. Additionally, Islamic financial institution 
should also launch Research & development programs (R&Ds) to develop Islamic financial 
markets to park excess liquidity. On the other hand, regulators should carefully consider our 
findings in the formation of liquidity and credit risk management policy for IBs as they are exposed 
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A Bibliometric Review of Takaful Literature2 
 
Abstract 
Takaful represents a growing financial segment addressing the insurance needs of Islamic societies 
and economies. Nonetheless, only recently the related literature achieved a significant number of 
contributions. Therefore, it has not been yet explored how research streams are evolving, where 
gaps in academic knowledge are, as well as which papers, authors and journals are more influential 
in this field. 
We provide a thorough analysis of existing contributions on Takaful, by adopting a meta-literature 
methodology that encompasses both a bibliometric (quantitative) and content (qualitative) 
analysis. By reviewing 65 articles, we aim at providing a rigorous background for the Islamic 
finance industry, its societies and economies, academic research and policymakers. 
We identify and review three leading research streams on Takaful: its overview, growth paths and 
models; governance mechanism; products/services and customer perception. We also identify the 
leading academic institutions, countries, journals, in this literature, as well as authors, their co-
authorship networks and their role in these streams. Finally, we derive and summarize 16 leading 
future research questions based on meta-literature review. 
 
Keywords: Takaful, Meta-Literature Review, Bibliometric Citation Analysis,  
Content Analysis, Islamic Finance, Islamic Insurance 
 




                                                          





Over the last three decades, Islamic finance has grown exponentially, reaching total assets of 
$2.05 trillion in 2017 and becoming one of the financial industry mainstreams. Takaful (Islamic 
insurance) is an important yet under-investigated segment of Islamic finance, despite its total 
contribution of USD 26.1 billion in 2016 (IFSB, 2018). A recent survey (Pew Research, 2017) 
shows that Muslims are 24% of the world population, or as high as over 1.8billion. With a 
significant projected population growth and recent regulatory and public awareness reforms, 
Takaful operators have the potential to become major players in the global insurance industry. 
Right now, they are expected to reach total assets of $40 billion with a compound average growth 
rate (CAGR) of 13% by 2023 (IFSB, 2018; IMARC, 2018) 
The concept of insurance is well-rooted in the Islamic economic system with the aim of 
promoting welfare and solidarity among all segments of society, through shared responsibility and 
mutual cooperation. Takaful is an alternative way of providing insurance services, compliant to 
Shariah principles, implying the absence of uncertainty, gambling and interest charge.  
In this regard, the role of corporate governance is among the most relevant issues in Takaful, 
due to the presence of multi-layer systems. Nevertheless, the relationship between policyholders 
and Takaful operators potentially increase agency issues, due to significant information 
asymmetries. Among other frequently described challenges there are also its peculiar solvency 
position, the lack of an effective dedicated reinsurance market, the call for specific expertise and 
skills from its human resources, as well as its different approach to investments and the role played 
by sukuk markets. 




Figure 1. Number of publications and total global citations on Takaful. 
The aim of this paper is to carry out a thorough bibliometric review, discussing the main aspects 
of Takaful literature and providing directions for future theoretical and empirical research. We 
adopt a bibliometric meta-analysis, with data visualization techniques coupled with content 
analysis (Alon et al., 2018).  
So far, only one study specifically analyses existing literature on Islamic insurance (Sadeghi, 
2010) through a traditional review, focusing on the evolution and growth of the Takaful market, 
the nature of Takaful and the comparison of Takaful with conventional insurance. 
Our meta-literature review is different in the following ways. Firstly, we analyze 65 articles up 
to 2019, through a novel quali-quantitative approach (bibliometric citation analysis and content 
analysis). Secondly, we apply citation, co-citation, co-authorship and cartography analysis through 
HistCite and VOSviewer software. Thirdly, we examine two extensive datasets: 49 articles from 
ISI Web of Knowledge (ISI WOK) published over the period 1950-2018 for bibliometric analysis 
 
Note: this figure presents the summary of our sample of Takaful papers across time, in terms of both the 






































































and additional 16 influential articles and working papers published in 2019 to present outside this 
reference source for content analysis. 
This study has multiple findings. Firstly, we present the influential aspects of Takaful literature 
in terms of countries, institutions, authors, top journals and articles/topics. Secondly, we identify 
the most relevant research streams: (1) Takaful overview, growth and models; (2) governance 
mechanism of Takaful market; (3) Takaful products/services and customer perception. Then, we 
discuss each stream after representing it through a cartographic analysis, encompassing co-
authorship networks. Finally, the meta-literature review allows us to identify suggestions for future 
research on this topic. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews our methodological 
approach. Section 3 presents the main results of the co-citation and content analysis, especially 
discussed thoroughly the leading research streams in Takaful. Section 4 presents our findings on 
future research streams and, finally, Section 5 concludes our paper. 
 
2. Methods 
In social sciences, methodologies such as the bibliometric analysis (quantitative) and the 
content analysis (qualitative) are becoming increasingly used by scholars (Zamore, Djan, Alon, 
and Hobdari, 2018). By contrast, they are still in their infancy in finance (see, for example, Zamore 
et al., 2018; Helbing, 2018).  
In this study, we perform a meta-literature review that consists of both a bibliometric analysis 
and content analysis of 65 articles up to 2019 on Takaful. The structure of our methodological 




































2.1 Sample selection process 
We adopt the research protocol in meta-literature analysis proposed by Apriliyanti and Alon 
(2017) by following three steps in the selection of investigated research papers. 
Visualization of coauthorship networks (VOSviewer) 
 What is the research domain of Takaful literature? 
 How is the Takaful literature structured in terms of research streams? 
 What are the influential aspects of literature, such as countries, institutions, 
journals, articles, topics, authors and their networks?  






B.1. Sample Selection Process 
Step 1. Source selection for citation data: ISI Web of Knowledge  
Step 2. Literature analysis within the database through keywords (Takaful, Islamic 
Insurance, Insurance and Islamic Finance, Islamic mutual insurance, Islamic 
cooperative insurance). Starting sample: 81 articles in the period 1950-2018.  
Step 3. Final sample of 49 articles for the meta-literature review, derived from an 
independent review of each paper carried by two researchers.  
B.2. Bibliometric Citation Analysis 
(1) Co-Citation Analysis Research streams identification (VOSviewer).  









 Identification of research streams in Takaful literature:  
a. Takaful overview, growth and Models  
b. Governance Mechanism of Takaful Market  
c. Takaful Product/Services and Customer perception 
 Identification of influential aspects: countries, institutions, authors, journals, 
articles, topics 




Firstly, we collect papers and citation data from the ISI – Web of Knowledge database, 
representing a significant source of high-quality research with citation data dating back to 1950. 
We limit our selection to year-end 2018. 
Then, we select the keywords able to analyze and discriminate papers within our sample. The 
most effective terms (i.e.: including most papers in the selection process), with decreasing ability 
in identifying papers potentially material for our sample, are: “Takaful”, “Islamic insurance”, 
“Insurance and Islamic finance”, “Islamic mutual insurance”, “Islamic cooperative insurance”. 
This search yields 81 articles, with the first paper being published in 2010. 
The final step is represented by a cursory examination of each paper, conducted independently 
by two researchers, to confirm or reject its relevance within the field of Takaful research. Inclusion 
or exclusion is contingent on an explicit address of the topic within the contribution (Zott et al., 
2011). Altogether, the final sample built through these steps consists of 49 articles, published from 
2010 to 2018.  
 
2.2 Meta-literature review 
The meta-literature review consists both on a bibliometric (quantitative) and content 
(qualitative) analysis. Price (1965) introduces the bibliometric analysis to identify relationships 
between articles based on citations (Kim and McMillan, 2008). In Downe-Wamboldt (2017, p. 
314) one can find the definition of the content analysis: “a research method that provides a 
systematic and objective means to make valid inferences from verbal, visual, or written data in 
order to describe and quantify specific phenomena”.  
Within this methodological framework, we apply the following four analyses attributable to the 
meta-literature analysis on Takaful: (1) a bibliometric co-citation analysis; (2) a bibliometric 
citation analysis, (3) a bibliometric co-authorship analysis, and (4) a content analysis.  
Consistently with Van Eck and Waltman (2014), we use HistCite and VOSviewer software to 
perform the bibliometric analysis. 
The prominent variables in the bibliometric analysis follow the HistCite - Glossary (2018): (1) 
Total number of publications on Takaful in the literature (PTAK); (2) Total global citations (TGC), 




Total local citations (TLC), representing the number of citations received by each article by other 
contributions in our sample; (4) Average global citations per year (TGC/t);  
(5) Average local citations per year (TLC/t). 
As a first step, the bibliometric co-citation analysis is carried through VOSviewer and allows 
us to identify three leading research streams, as in Alon et al., 2018. Figure 3 illustrates this result, 
as well as connections across contributions. The concept of co-citation refers to the frequency with 
which two articles are cited together and, therefore, implies a strong connection between them 
(Small, 1973; Zupic and Čater, 2015).  
In the second stage, we identify influential aspects of the literature in terms of bibliometric 
citation through HistCite. We classify contributions in terms of institutions (Table 2), countries 
(Table 3), journals (Table 4), authors (Table 5 and Figure 4), and articles (Table 6). This process 
is conducted consistently with Øyna and Alon (2018) and Iddy and Alon (2019). 
In the third stage, we present the authorship network in the literature on Takaful through a 
bibliometric co-authorship citation analysis (see Table 4 and Figure 4) by using VOSviewer 
software (Piette and Ross, 1992).  
Finally, we coupled bibliometric analysis with content analysis, following a more traditional 
approach of articles review (Bahoo et al., 2018; Gaur and Kumar, 2018). We content analyzed 65 
articles, including 49 articles from ISI WOK up to 2018, plus 16 influential articles and working 
papers published in 2019 to draw our conclusions and suggestions for future research on Takaful. 
 
3. Results of co-citation analysis: identification and review of Takaful research streams 
We identify citation mapping by using VOSviewer software by following Iddy and Alon 
(2019). VOSviewer provides a visual representation of networks of articles that is based on co-
citations, and clusters them into leading research streams identified by different colors.  
Our results reveal that the Takaful literature is mainly organized in three clusters (Figure 3). To 
label these streams, we content analyze each paper. The resulting identification leads to the 
following denomination: (1) Takaful overview, growth and Models; (2) Governance Mechanism 







In the following paragraphs we review the main contents of Takaful literature as emerging from 
these three research streams. Table 1 presents the list of main papers discussed in these streams.  
 
Table 1. Key papers and databases. 
Author/s 
Name 






The Cost Efficiency of Takaful Insurance 
Companies 
The Geneva Papers on 
Risk and Insurance - 






Religious influences on consumers' high-
involvement purchasing decisions 





Md Husin et 
al 
2016c 
The roles of mass media, word of mouth 
and subjective norm in family takaful 
purchase intention 





Figure 3. Research streams on Takaful identified through the co-citation analysis. 
 
 
Note: this figure presents the result of the research streams identification process, labeled through the 
content analysis. Each point represents one contribution (author, year and journal) and links represent 
citation patterns. The three main streams are Takaful overview, growth and models (in Blue), 















Do Muslims intend to participate in Islamic 
insurance?: Analysis from theory of 
planned behavior  







Credit Default Sharing Instead of Credit 
Default 
Swaps: Toward a More Sustainable 
Financial 
System 
Journal of Economic 
Issues 
 Theoretical  
Masud 2011 
Takaful: An innovative approach to 
insurance and Islamic Finance  
University of 






Cost efficiency and board composition 
under different takaful insurance 
business models 










Predicting intention to participate in family 
takaful scheme using decomposed theory of 
planned behaviour 








Family Takaful in developing countries: the 
case of Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) 
International Journal of 
Islamic and Middle 
Eastern Finance and 
Management 







IPO underpricing in the insurance industry 
and the effect of Sharia compliance: 
Evidence from Saudi Arabian market 
International Journal of 
Islamic and Middle 











Cooperative Takaful for Non-Banking 
Financial Institutions: Islamization of 
SOCSO in the case of Malaysia 
Intellectual Discourse  Theoretical  
Ustaoglu 2015 
Public Awareness, Understanding and 
Attitudes towards Interest-free Insurance 
(Takaful) Services Evaluation by Education 
Level: Survey Based on Empirical Analysis 
for Turkey 








Governance mechanisms and efficiency: 
Evidence from an alternative insurance 
(Takaful) market 
Journal of International 
Financial Markets, 





Akhter et al 2017 
A comparison of Islamic and conventional 
insurance demand: Worldwide evidence 








Ernst & Young 
Takaful Reports 





Corporate demand for general takāful in 
Malaysia 
ISRA International 














Optimal incentives for takaful (Islamic 
insurance) operators 





Wahab et al 
2007 
Islamic Takaful: Business Models, Shariah 




 Theoretical  
Abu Kasim 2012 
Disclosure of Shariah compliance by 
Malaysian takaful companies 
Journal of Islamic 
Accounting and 
Business Research 












Takaful standards and customer perceptions 
affecting takaful practices in Pakistan: a 
survey 
International Journal of 
Islamic and Middle 








The impact of competition on cost 
efficiency of insurance and takaful sectors: 
Evidence from GCC markets based on the 














 Theoretical  
Ayub  2007 
Takaful: An Alternative to Conventional 
Insurance. In: Understanding Islamic 
Finance 
Book chapter from the 
book Understanding 
Islamic Finance John 
Wiley and Sons Ltd 




The Efficiency of Life Insurance and 
Family Takaful in Malaysia: Relative 




Annual Reports Empirical 
Billah 1998 
Islamic Insurance: Its Origins and 
Development 




Islamic insurance (takaful): demand and 
supply in the UK 
International Journal of 
Islamic and Middle 
Eastern Finance and 
Management 




Analysis of Demand for Family Takaful and 
Life Insurance: A Comparative Study in 
Malaysia 
Journal of Islamic 
Economics, Banking 
and Finance 




Factors influencing the choice of Takaful 
over conventional insurance: the case of 
Malaysia 






Islamic Principle and Takaful Insurance: 
Re-evaluation 
Journal of Insurance 
Regulation 
 Theoretical  
Matsawali 2012 
A Study on Takaful and Conventional 
Insurance Preferences: The Case of Brunei 
International Journal of 








An analysis of Islamic Takaful insurance; A 
cooperative insurance mechanism. 
Journal of Insurance 
Regulation 





Evidence on the relationship between 
Takaful insurance and fundamental 
perception of Islamic principles 
Applied Financial 
Economics Letters 




Economic Determinants of Family Takaful 
Consumption: Evidence From Malaysia 
International Review of 
Business Research 
Papers 






Determinants of demand on family Takaful 
in Malaysia 
Journal of Islamic 
Accounting and 
Business Research 






Yazid et al 2012 
Determinants of Family Takaful (Islamic 
Life Insurance) Demand: A Conceptual 
Framework for a Malaysian Study 
International Journal of 
Business and 
Management 







3.1 Review of research streams: Takaful overview, growth and models 
The leading research stream in terms of numerosity within our literature sample is represented 
by the description of Takaful, the analysis of its business models and its growth.  
Frequently, papers discuss the role of insurance within Islamic finance, since it does not comply 
with Islamic principles, in spite of not being entirely excluded that actions taken in order to reduce 
losses are legitimate (Maysami and Kwon, 1999; Maysamia and Williams, 2006), as a form of 
mutual aid. However, it requires fully-shared responsibility across participants and discourage 
wealth maximization (Masud, 2011).  
The vast majority of the literature recalls that, for this reason, conventional insurance violates 
the principles of gharar (uncertainty is managed asymmetrically), maisir/qimar (gambling and 
speculation when  gains of one party are contingent on losses of the other), riba (interest-bearing 
exposures) (Alshammari, et al., 2019; Akhter, et al., 2017; Coolen‐Maturi, 2013; Abdul Wahab , 
et al., 2007; Ayub, 2007). 
Defining Takaful is frequently discussed by the literature (Ayub, 2007; Billah, 1998). Its 
etymology is linked to the Arabic word “kafl”, meaning guaranteeing, securing and taking care of 
one’s need. While the simplest form of Takaful is very close to mutuality across participants to a 
risk-pooling mechanism, the first juridical definition is found in the Malaysian Takaful Act (1984): 
“A scheme based on brotherhood, solidarity and mutual assistance which provides for mutual 
financial aid and assistance to the participants in case of need whereby the participants mutually 
agree to contribute for that purpose”.  
More recently, AAOIFI (2015) defines it as: “A process of agreement among a group of persons 
to handle the injuries resulting from specific risks to which all of them are vulnerable. A process, 
thus initiated, involves payment of contributions as donations, and leads to the establishment of 
an insurance fund that enjoys the status of a legal entity and has independent financial liability”. 
The contractual nature of Takaful involves two Islamic concepts: tabarru, that means voluntary 
donation or contribution (Abdul Wahab , et al., 2007) and waqf, which refers to endowment and 
retention of property/wealth for a specific purpose (Ayub, 2007). Contracts are also typically 
separated between family (life) and general (property/casualty or non-life) Takaful (Ayub, 2007).  
The definition also includes discussion of business models that provide Takaful products and 




or commissions for its services. Despite several variations across countries, most references point 
towards the mudarabah and the wakalah models (Abdul Kader, et al., 2014; Masud, 2011; Abdul 
Wahab , et al., 2007). 
Mudarabah is a partnership-based contract where one party provides capital and the second 
participates with skills, at a pre-determined sharing ratio (f.i. 60-40% or 50-50%) (Ibrahim and 
Ali, 2015; Ayub, 2007; Abdul Wahab , et al., 2007))). Figure 4 presents this mechanism.   
 




Wakalah resembles a conventional principal-agent contract, where the TO acts as agent on 
behalf of policyholders, receiving a pre-defined fee/commission for the managing effort (Swartz 









Figure 5: Wakalah model adapted from Abdul Wahab et al., 2007 
 
 
The growth and performance of the Takaful industry are also frequently discussed within this 
stream, as the first examples date back only to 1979, in Sudan and Saudi Arabia (Alshammari, et 
al., 2018; Lewis, 2015). The most recent cross-country data (IFSB, 2018) shows an increasing 
pace of growth (12.5% globally, or around 26 billion USD, in 2016, with Takaful operators 
growing from 100-150 to 330 in just a decade). However, it is highly concentrated: Saudi Arabia 
(38%), Iran (34%), Malaysia (7%) and UAE (6%) represent 86% of the global market. Compared 
to the usual growth pattern shown by conventional insurance, that sees non-life (marine) risks 
covered first and life insurance later, general Takaful dominates in GCC (93%) and MENA (non-
GCC, 86%), while family Takaful leads in South East Asia-Pacific (74%) and South Asia (58%).  
Finally, a growing number of theoretical and especially empirical papers deals with the 
comparison between Takaful and conventional insurance (Masud, 2011; Sadeghi, 2010; Kwon, 
2007). Masud (2011) identifies five specific fundamentals of Takaful: (1) mutuality and risk-
sharing (Kwon, 2007; Maysamia and Williams, 2006; Billah, 1998); (2) ownership of funds 
remains with the participant; (3) the elimination of uncertainty (gharar); (4) the role of 





3.2 Review of research streams: Governance mechanism of Takaful market  
The role of corporate governance (CG) appears crucial in Takaful, as documented by our second 
research stream.  
Within the context of business models, the relationship between policyholders and Takaful 
operators make the agency issue more complex, since the former do not have any direct or indirect 
role in designing contracts. In the same direction, Asafa and Smith (2019) identify the issues and 
challenges faced by policyholders with reference to asymmetric information and in assessing price 
and quality of products. Furthermore, they suggest that part of current practices may diverge from 
the required structure of Islamic insurance and, through maximization of own benefits, they may 
convey reputational damage to the Takaful market. 
Takaful operators have multi-layers governance structure. In addition to the traditional Board 
of Directors (BODs), the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB), along with a Shariah Auditing 
Committee, monitor and approve operations assuring compliance to Islamic principles. This role 
involves also guidance to management on governance, product design and enforcement of 
contracts: in case of violation, the whole transaction is turned to charity and kept separated from 
other activities.  
CG in Takaful is the focus of few studies. Karbhari et al. (2018) study the impact of CG on 
efficiency in Takaful for 21 countries, finding several managerial and operational inefficiencies. 
More specifically, they report that CEO/chair duality significantly improves both technical and 
scale efficiencies, while SSB has a positive impact only on scale efficiency. Surprisingly, the 
impact of audit committees remains insignificant across all efficiency level. Abdul Kader et al. 
(2014:2010) report similar findings but with no impact of SSB on efficiency. 
Alshammari et al. (2019) test the quiet life hypothesis, while studying the impact of competition 
on the comparative cost efficiency of conventional insurance and Takaful in GCC countries. The 
quiet life hypothesis suggests that managers in a less competitive market may not use their full 
efforts to maximize the profitability of the firm and enjoy a “quiet life”.  Authors posit that 
competition has a positive relationship with cost efficiency in the GCC insurance market, including 
Takaful. However, the results vary across business models, with a negative relationship of the 




Transparency in financial disclosures also plays a vital role in stengthening CG, since it reduces 
information asymmetry among stakeholders (Armstrong, et al., 2016) and increases their 
confidence towards firms’ operations. In a similar context, Akther and Hussain (2012) identify the 
lack of transparency in reporting standards and internal control for Takaful in Pakistan. They argue 
that Takaful is following the same reporting standards as conventional insurance. Similarly, Abu 
Kasim (2012) finds the SSB disclosure to be fully in conformity with supervisor’s guidelines; 
however, it seems that instead of following the essence of disclosure practices, it is driven by a 
simple compliance to rules. Moreover, the role of SSB is also constrained in Malaysian Takaful: 
being hired part-time, they do not participate to every stage of product development. This is also 
further evidenced by Boulanouar and Alqahtani (2016), who do not find any effect of Shariah 
compliance on the underpricing of Takaful, which is probably due to underwriters not considering 
the Shariah status of Takaful firms. 
 Albeit Takaful and conventional insurance share some features, the former is more prone to 
agency problems due to a more complex product design and contractual relationship. Khan (2015) 
proposes a modified agency theory in the context of Takaful, arguing that if incentives should 
include surplus-sharing, this might not be optimal for mudarabah models. Furthermore, a wakalah 
hybrid model is suggested, since it encourages the Takaful operator to increase the pool of funds 
and reduces the risk for the policyholder. Moreover, Kallamu and Saat (2015) empirically support 
the agency theory by finding that an independent auditing committee enhances the profitability of 
Takaful firms, while the dual role of directors in auditing and nomination committees reduce it. 
They also argue that an independent director efficiently monitors management and restricts a 
potential opportunistic behavior. 
 
3.3 Review of research streams: Takaful Product/Services and Customer perception 
This stream of literature studies products and services offered by Takaful, focusing on 
customers’ perceptions (Akther and Hussain, 2012; Swartz and Coetzer, 2010), corporate demand 
(Gustina and Abdullah, 2012; Coolen‐Maturi, 2013; Mokhtar et al., 2017; Akhter et al., 2017), 
customer preferences among Takaful and conventional insurance (Matsawali et al., 2012; Kamil 





Notwithstanding its growth, Takaful still shows very low penetration levels if compared to the 
insurance industry, also when focusing on several Muslim countries only. It seems that a leading 
role is played by a lack of customers awareness. Maysami and Williams (2006) argue that a large 
segment of the Muslim population surprisingly ignores Takaful, requiring significant investments 
in awareness campaigns. Furthermore, Muslims with more conservative beliefs are reluctant 
towards Takaful, not being entirely assured about its compliance with Shariah requirements. 
Akther and Hussain (2012) conduct a survey on customers’ loyalty and perception in Pakistan, 
concluding that 91% of respondents do not know Takaful. Swartz and Coetzer (2010), with similar 
findings, also emphasize on launching awareness programs for both customers but also for agents 
and similar market players.  
Gustina and Abdullah (2012) analyze the determinants for the demand of family Takaful and 
life insurance in the Malaysian market for the period of 1990-2009, finding that religion, education, 
savings and GDP per capita are the main drivers. They argue that a higher acceptance rate of family 
Takaful over life insurance is associated to the religious and cultural background of the overall 
insurance market and channeling of pooled funds towards ethical and socially responsible 
directions.  
The demand for corporate Takaful is relatively low in Malaysia: despite a fundamental 
awareness, the value proposition and a better product offer and efficiency of services outperform 
Shariah compliance (Mokhtar, et al., 2017). A positive association between knowledge of Takaful 
and adoption in Malaysia from both agents and customers is found by Kamil and Nor (2014). 
However, Matsawali et al. (2012) report that people in Brunei, despite their lack of Takaful 
knowledge, still prefer it. With the same motive, Coolen‐Maturi (2013) suggests to offer Takaful 
through the banking channel in the UK market, arguing that people are willing to buy provided 
that they offer better or similar benefits with competitive prices.   
We identify another stream of literature on the acceptance and adoption of Takaful from the 
perspective of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB). Extending the theory of reasoned actions, 
it predicts the intention of behavioral engagement towards a specific action at a specific time and 
place (Ajzen, 1991). The preliminary studies of Md Husin and Ab Rahman (2016a; 2016b; 2016c) 




be explained by awareness, knowledge, perceived behavioral control, attitude and exposure 
towards Takaful practices (Ustaoglu, 2014; Siala, 2013).  
Akhter et al. (2017) identify two main drivers of Takaful demand: the economic and 
demographic dynamics of a country. Economics factors include inflation, GDP, savings rate, 
inflation and income, while demographic variables encompass education quality (including 
religion), health and urbanization. Authors empirically document that GDP per capita is negatively 
associated with both Takaful and conventional insurance, although the former showed more 
resilience during the recent financial crises. Moreover, the level of education has a significantly 
positive impact on Takaful only. Redzuan et al. (2009) show similar findings, in particular a 
negative impact of long term interest rates and composite stock indexes. 
Similarly, Sherif and Shaairi (2013:2017) demonstrate that higher income, Islamic banking 
development, dependency ratios and education increase the demand for Takaful. An increase in 
income renders Takaful more accessible; however, it might be indifferent if wealth allows to 
absorb risks within individual financial portfolios. These findings are consistent with those of 
Yazid et al. (2012). 
 
3.4 Citation analysis: influential aspects of the Takaful literature 
After identifying and discussing the leading research streams, we employ a bibliometric 
methodology to assess the features of the most influential literature. By using HistCite, we focus 
on the following variables: countries, institutions, authors, journals, articles and co-authorship 
networks. 
We identify the most influential countries and institutions based on the number of published 
papers (PTAK), accordingly to Kim and McMillan (2008). Tables 2 and 3 show that research on 
Takaful is not limited to Muslim countries and includes the USA, Australia, and the UK. 
Nonetheless, the top three institutions are the International Islamic University Malaysia, the 









Table 2. Ranking of influential institutions and citation metrics on Takaful  
 Institute PTAK % PTAK of 
total 
TLC TGC 
1 International Islamic University Malaysia 12 24.5 1 5 
2 University of Malaya 9 18.4 3 14 
3 International Shariah Research Academy for 
Islamic Finance 3 
6.1 0 0 
4 Universiti Putra Malaysia 3 6.1 0 1 
5 Bournemouth University 2 4.1 8 25 
6 COMSATS Inst Information Technology 2 4.1 0 0 
7 La Trobe University 2 4.1 0 0 
8 University of Bath 2 4.1 1 3 
9 Universiti Brunei Darussalam 2 4.1 0 0 
10 University of Technology Malaysia 2 4.1 3 11 
Note: this table presents the breakdown of the leading contributions in our sample of Takaful papers by the 
reference institution, as well as their bibliographic metrics: the number of publications (PTAK) and its 
relative weight (%PTAK of total), total local citations (TLC) and total global citations (TGC). 
 




Country PTAK % PTAK of 
total 
TLC TGC 
1 Malaysia 31 63.3 4 20 
2 UK 6 12.2 8 39 
3 Nigeria 4 8.2 0 1 
4 Pakistan 4 8.2 0 0 
5 Saudi Arabia 4 8.2 0 5 
6 Turkey 3 6.1 1 1 
7 Australia 2 4.1 0 0 
8 Brunei 2 4.1 0 0 
9 USA 2 4.1 1 7 
Note: this table presents the breakdown of the leading contributions in our sample of Takaful papers by the 
reference country, as well as their bibliographic metrics: the number of publications (PTAK) and its relative 
weight (%PTAK of total), total local citations (TLC) and total global citations (TGC). 
 
We also present the list of leading journals, both in terms of number of published papers (PTAK) 
and their influence, measured by the yearly number of global citations (TGC/t), as in Fetscherin 
and Heinrich (2015). Results are provided in Table 4. Our results show that leading finance and 






Table 4. Ranking of productive and influential journals 
 
  
Sorted by number of articles published 
 Journal PTAK % PTAK of total TLC/t TGC/t 
1 ISRA-IJIF 4 8.2 0 0 
2 JIABR 4 8.2 0.33 1.67 
3 IJIMEFM 3 6.1 0 0.83 
4 HU 2 4.1 0 0 
5 ID 2 4.1 0.33 0.33 
6 IJEAS 2 4.1 0 0 
7 JIM 2 4.1 0.67 2 
8 MEJM 2 4.1 0 0 
9 AJBM 1 2 0 0 
10 AS 1 2 0 0 
 
 Sorted by global citations per year 
 Journal PTAK % PTAK of total TLC/t TGC/t 
1 GPRIP 1 2 0.78 2.44 
2 JSM 1 2 0 2.17 
3 JIM 2 4.1 0.67 2 
4 JIABR 4 8.2 0.33 1.67 
5 IJIMEFM 3 6.1 0 0.83 
6 JOE 1 2 0 0.8 
7 QRIFM 1 2 0 0.75 
8 IJSE 1 2 0 0.67 
9 IRFA 1 2 0.2 0.6 
10 IJEMA 1 2 0 0.5 
Note: the table represents the top 10 journals based on number of articles published (PTAK) and average 
number of global or local citations per year (TGC/t and TLC/t, respectively). Full details on individual 
journals are provided in Appendix A1. 
 
Moreover, we identify influential authors, co-authorship networks. Again, we base our ranking on 
the number of global citations (TGC), as in Kim and McMillan (2008). Leading authors published 
39% of the papers in our sample, as shown in Table 5. Further, co-authorship networks (Liu et al., 
2005; Piette and Ross, 1992) are graphically presented in Figure 6. The identification of the top 
influential authors and the network among them is essential for the growth of the field, as a 
























1 Mike Adams University of Swansea, UK 2 4.1 8 25 
2 Philip Hardwick  University of Bournemouth, UK 2 4.1 8 25 
3 Hale Abdul Kader University of Nottingham, UK 2 4.1 8 25 
4 Asmak Ab. Rahman University of Malaya 4 8.2 3 13 
5 Maizaitulaidawati Md 
Husin 
University of Technology Malaysia 4 8.2 3 13 
6 Haytham Siala  Roehampton University, London, UK 1 2 0 13 
7 Noriszura Ismail The National University of Malaysia  2 4.1 2 7 
8 Hania Masud University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 
United States 
1 2 0 4 
9 Nader Naifar  Al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic 
University 
 
1 2 0 4 
Co-Authorship Network 
Co-Authorship Network in 
Streams: A=Red, B=Green, 
C=Blue 
Author Institution 
A Zulkornain Yusop Universiti Putra Malaysia 
A Alias Radam Universiti Putra Malaysia 
A Rubayah Yakob The National University of Malaysia 
A Noriszura Ismail The National University of Malaysia  
B Ahmad Hidayat Buang University of Malaya 
B Wan Marhaini Wan Ahmad University of Malaya 
B Asmak Ab. Rahman University of Malaya 
C Aziz, Shahab Universiti Teknologi Malaysia 
C Hussin, Nazimah Universiti Teknologi Malaysia  
C Maizaitulaidawati Md Husin University of Technology Malaysia 
Note: The table shows the list of the 9 most influential authors publishing on Takaful based on total global 
citations (TGC) and co-authorship networks. Metrics include the relative weight of the number of publications 
(PTAK), total local (TLC) and global citations (TGC). These top 9 authors published 39% of articles in our 
sample. The details of authors who formulate a network in figure 6 are presented through the notation “A, B, 
C”, were A refers to Takaful overview, growth and models (Blue, above), B to Governance mechanism of 





   
Finally, we present in Table 6 the most influential articles, ranked by the number of their local and 
global citations (TLC/t and TGC/t), consistently with Apriliyanti and Alon (2017). The main focus 
of these studies is to investigate the efficiency of Takaful firms (Abdul Kader, et al., 2010), the 
determinants of customer intentions towards purchasing Takaful (Md Husin and Ab Rahman, 
2016a; Md Husin , et al., 2016c; Ustaoglu, 2014) and Takaful for non-banking financial institutions 






Figure 6. Co-authorship Network on Takaful and research streams 
 
Note: this figure presents the result of the co-authorship identification process, distinguished by 
research stream. Each point represents one author and links represent co-authorships. The three main 
streams are Takaful overview, growth and models (in Blue), Governance mechanism of Takaful (in 





Table 6. List of influential articles  
 
 
Sorted by TLC/t  
Author(s) and Year Journal TLC TLC/t TGC 
1 Kader, Adams, and Hardwick (2010)  GPRIP 7 0.78 22 
2 Husin , Ismail, and  Rahman, (2016) JSM 2 0.67 6 
3 Noor and  Ab Rahman (2016) ID 1 0.33 1 
4 Husin and  Rahman (2016) JIAB 1 0.33 5 
5 Ustaoglu M (2015) JAFS 1 0.25 3 
  
Sorted by TGC/t 
 Author(s) and Year Journal TGC TGC/t TLC 
1 Kader, Adams, and Hardwick (2010)  GPRIP 22 2.44 7 
2 Siala (2013) JSM 13 2.17 0 
3 Husin, Ismail, and Rahman (2016) JSM 6 2.0 2 
4 Husin and Rahma (2016) JIAB 5 1.67 1 
5 Naifar (2014) JEI 4 0.8 0 
Note: This table represents the 5 most influential and trending articles/topics based on total yearly local 
(TLC/t) and global citations (TGC/t). The full details of journals are given in Appendix A. 
 
4. Future Research Directions 
The bibliometric review of the literature, complemented by content analysis, allows us to 
identify several suggestions for future research (Table 7) and to discuss their width and breadth. 
 
Table 7. Future research questions 
 




1 What are the similarities/differences in the interpretation 
of Shariah laws with respect to different school of 
thoughts and jurisdictions?  
Abdul Wahab et al., 
2007; Ayub, 2007 
2 What are the steps required to have standardized Shariah 
supervision and regulatory framework for takaful 
industry? 
 
Authors’ review  
 
3 Development of financial products for the takaful 
market.  
 







 (Lee & Chang, 2016). 
4 How do takaful firms invest their financial resources? 
5 Do takaful activities spur economic growth? 
 
6 
Does institutional environment matter in shaping the 
beneficial mechanism of risk sharing in the takaful 







7 Does SSB improve the efficiency of Takaful firms as 
compared to conventional insurance?   
 
Karbhari et al., 2018 
 
8 What is the impact of SSB and CG on the profitability of 
takaful?  




9 There are plenty of studies investigating the impact of 
SSB on performance and risk-taking behavior of Islamic 
banking, but further detailed studies are required to study 
the impact of CG/SSB on risk-taking behavior of takaful 
industry. 
10 What is the impact of national culture on the stability and 
risk-taking behavior of takaful firms? 
Gaganis et al., 2019 
11 Does CG/SSB mediate the impact of national culture on 
the stability and risk-taking behavior of takaful firms? 
Authors’ review 
 
12 Khan (2015) proposed a modified version of agency 
theory with respect to the contractual nature of takaful 







13 Most studies on demand for takaful products and its 
determinants are restricted to a country or a city in a 
specific country.  Future studies are required with larger 
samples investigating cross-country variations in demand 
for takaful products and services. 
Sherif and Hussnain, 
2017; Md Husin and 






Authors’ review  
14 What are the implications of different marketing and 
behavioral theories for the takaful industry? 
15 Are takaful customers really faith driven?  
 
16 What is the role of financial and religious literacy on the 
preference of Takaful over conventional insurance? 
(Lin et al., 2017) 
Note: This table presents the main directions for future research as explicitly suggested by reviewed papers and 
identified through content analysis, or as derived from reviewing the relevant literature on the specific research stream 
by our meta-literature review (identified as “authors’ review”). 
 
Above all, we identify a frequent call towards the role of SSB in promoting the development of 
Islamic finance. The utmost challenge in this direction is represented by potential discrepancies in 
the interpretation of Islamic principles across jurisdictions and its effects on Takaful (f.i. on the 
distribution of the surplus sharing). Future studies may encompass the design of a coherent and 
standardized supervisory and regulatory framework. 
Another important issue is represented by the presence of underdeveloped capital and money 
markets and, in particular, limitations on investments within sukuk that, despite tremendous 
growth, are potentially seen as limiting the needs of Takaful. Future research may explore further 
the nature of Sukuk within Takaful, as well as the availability of other sources of admissible 




The current literature on corporate governance in Takaful is mostly theoretical, with empirical 
studies showing inconclusive results (Karbhari et al., 2018; Abdul Kader et al., 2014). These 
studies mostly ignore the role of SSB in comparing it with conventional insurance. Therefore, it is 
not clear whether the additional layer of CG has any impact on Takaful, especially in terms of 
efficiency and profitability. 
The role of SSB is also crucial in determining the risk-taking behavior of Islamic financial 
institutions (IFIs). Several studies investigate the impact of SSB on performance and risk-taking 
behavior of Islamic banking (Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 2018; Mollah and Zaman, 2015), but 
further studies are required for Takaful.  
Gaganis et al. (2019) argue that insurance is a culture-specific product, that should be evaluated 
and designed on the basis of cultural norms and patterns. This matters for Takaful as well, beyond 
religion itself and extending to country-specific cultural norms. Future research might consider 
focusing on the impact of national culture on the stability and performance of Takaful and could 
also help in designing the favourable conditions for its effectiveness and further growth. 
Recently, Khan (2015) proposes a modified version of agency theory for Takaful but no study 
has been conducted to test it. With the main argument involving a required surplus sharing to 
incentivizing Takaful operators, it might not be optimal for mudarabah models if compared to 
wakalah hybrid modes. Empirical research is then called within this stream.  
A significant body of research reports the association between insurance, economic growth and 
stability. Takaful is expected to produce similar results, but empirically assessing the role played 
in achieving stable economic growth is also an interesting research field. 
Similarly, the institutional environment (f.i. political, legal and economic environment) mediate 
the role financial development on economic growth (Lee & Chang, 2016). Moreover, although the 
nature of takaful and insurance is different but takful is governed within the same regulatory 
framework as of insurance industry in most of the countries. Thus, the role of the institutional 
environment in shaping the beneficial mechanism of risk sharing in the takaful industry and its 
impact on economic growth is still a puzzle and call for new studies. 
Most of the current literature on the determinants for the Takaful demand is limited to one 
country or even specific cities. Therefore, larger samples are needed to test cross-country 




the effectiveness and design of customer awareness programs are still open to an empirical 
assessment.  
Financial literacy plays a crucial role in the decision-making process of purchasing a financial 
product(Lin, et al., 2017). This is more evident in the case of Takaful products which are driven 
by religious laws. Thus, future studies are required considering the impact of financial and 
religious literacy on the demand for takaful products.  
 
5. Conclusions and limitations 
This paper presents all major aspects of the Takaful literature through a meta-literature review. 
Under this approach, we incorporate two datasets for the period 1950-2018: 49 articles from ISI 
WOK for our bibliometric analysis and 65 articles for the content analysis. We apply the following 
techniques to assess the Islamic insurance literature: a bibliometric citation and co-citation 
analysis, a co-authorship analysis, a cartographic analysis, and content analysis.  
Our results reveal the influential aspects of Takaful literature such as countries, authors, 
institutions, and articles. Furthermore, we identify three main research streams: (1) Takaful 
overview, growth, and models, (2) governance mechanism of Takaful, (3) Takaful products and 
services and customer perception. 
Lastly, this study presents the future research agenda for Takaful. The common ground that 
seems to link all proposals for forthcoming research can be summarized as follows, with relevant 
policy implications. The role played by insurance in fostering economic growth is well known and 
it is reasonable to expect a similar effect for Takaful. However, there are currently limitations to 
its development that need investigation. Firstly, the interpretation of Shariah principles and cultural 
differences produce diversity in governance, products and regulation versus a generalized call for 
greater standardization. Secondly, the Shariah board may play a role in terms of performance, 
efficiency and risk-taking that has not been scrutinized in depth yet for Takaful. Thirdly, growth 
is affected by the lack of consumers’ awareness, whereas marketing and behavioral implications 
have not been analyzed in order to produce strong evidence of best practices. Finally, some results 
in the literature are extremely limited in geographical scope and need to be tested empirically for 




This study is also subject to some limitations. Firstly, our methodology may miss high-quality 
papers that currently received no citations (Apriliyanti and Alon, 2017). Secondly, we also may 
have missed papers that are not listed in our main literature source (ISI WOK), despite we reduced 
this limitation by extending our initial sample towards unlisted or working papers, to the best of 
our knowledge. However, we did not incorporate additional sources, such as Google Scholar, due 
to the different implied data quality.  
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Trade, financial openness and Islamic banks: Evidence from GCC Region3 
 
Abstract  
The recent wave of liberalization in GCC countries has opened up a debate on the role of Islamic 
finance in the financial development of an economy. By using a comprehensive dataset of 44 
Islamic and 48 conventional banks for the period 2007-2015, in this paper we investigate the 
impact of trade and financial openness on financial development in the GCC region. We find that 
trade and financial openness have a positive impact on Islamic bank profitability but simultaneous 
openness to both trade and capital markets reduces the profitability of Islamic banks. Moreover, 
the trade and financial openness affect Islamic banks in a different way compared to conventional 
banks. Particularly, we unveil that trade and financial openness increase the loan volume, but 
reduce (increase) the stability of Islamic banks (conventional banks). 
 
 
Keywords: Trade openness, Financial openness, Islamic banks, Z-score, Distance-to-Default. 
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1. Introduction  
The recent wave of liberalization in GCC countries has opened up a debate on the role of Islamic 
finance in the financial development of an economy. Preliminary literature provides enough 
evidence that financial development positively contributes to the economic growth of a country. 
Rajan & Zingales (2003) proposed openness theory of financial development, suggesting that the 
level of financial development depends on the country’s overall participation in global goods and 
financial markets. According to this theory, existing industrial and financial groups are usually 
against the financial development, arguing that financial openness will make easier for the new 
entrants to start a business, which will further reduce the monopoly of the existing groups.  
Trade and financial openness are interconnected. Trade openness increases the competition by 
bringing more foreign companies, putting pressure on domestic firms to invest more in their overall 
infrastructure. Therefore, regulatory authorities are encouraged to bring reform in the financial 
sector to have an easy access to loans. Those financial reforms make the banking sector more 
competitive, decreasing the cost of a loan for firms and increasing the volume of credit in the 
economy. On the other hand, higher financial openness will open external sources of funding from 
international money and capital markets for domestic firms, accelerating the competition in the 
credit market. In order to be competitive, the bank will likely reduce the cost of the loan for firms 
(Ashraf, 2018). 
Trade and financial openness might also affect the stability of a bank. Higher trade openness 
gives a bank an advantage to improve its borrower's selection, which should reduce the bank risk. 
On the other hand, trade and financial openness foster the competition, which can reduce the cost 
of credit. Thus, banks might relax their credit standards and increase financing on the asset side of 
their balance in order to compensate for the lower cost of loans, hence, increasing overall bank 
risk and reducing the bank stability.  
Since the structure of Islamic banks is different, we might observe different pattern for them, 
comparing to conventional, at least for two reasons. Firstly, Islamic banks do not deal only in 
documents but also in goods, making real economic transactions and promoting the real economy, 




Secondly, the basic essence of Islamic banks is to promote the culture of risk sharing (i.e. profit 
& loss sharing, P&LS), being not involved in transactions based on interest, uncertainty, and 
speculation. Therefore, in an ideal situation of P&LS mode of financing, trade and financial 
openness should positively affect Islamic banks’ cost and volume of financing, unlike conventional 
banks. Moreover, the clients on both sides of the Islamic bank balance sheet can enjoy maximum 
profit and, even in the case of a recesion, the losses would be shared. This process would not put 
the overall economy on stake as happened during recent subprime financial crises. 
The previous research on Islamic banks mainly focused on profitability (Azad et al. 2019; 
Yanikkaya et al., 2018), efficiency (Safiullah & Shamsuddin, 2019; Beck et al. 2013), stability 
(Albaity et al., 2019; Čihák & Hesse, 2010) and risk management (Hassan et al., 2019; Ibrahim & 
Rizvi, 2018; Abedifar et al. 2013). There are very few papers assessing the impact of Islamic banks 
on financial development and, eventually, on economic growth (Grassa & Gazdar, 2014; Hassan 
et al., 2013; Imam & Kpodar, 2016; Kassim, 2016). In general, the authors find Islamic banks to 
positively contribute to the economic growth of the country, but without taking into account the 
impact of trade and financial openness on financial development. 
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of trade and financial openness on 
the development of the banking sector in GCC countries over the period of 2007-2015. The GCC 
is the ideal region to investigate this topic, for mainly two reasons. First, GCC countries share 
similar economic policies, including free trade and capital movements with high-level of trade 
openness, that varies from 60.86% in Saudi Arabia to 205% in UAE (WDI, 2016). The GCC 
countries have also taken many initiatives to increase the role of the private sector (e.g. Saudi 
Arabia is planning to expand privatization in 16 sectors and also the sale of ARAMCO). Second, 
GCC countries are arguably considered to be the hub of Islamic finance with total assets of USD 
927.1 billion, including Islamic banking assets of USD 704.8 billion (IFSB, 2019). 
To briefly preview our results, we find that trade and financial openness have a positive and 
significant impact on the cost of Islamic bank credit, while the simultaneous impact of trade and 
financial openness is negative. This last result implies that a country, with high level of both trade 
and financial openness, experiences a reduction of Islamic banks’ profitability. This study also 




loans, suggesting that Islamic banks can reap the benefit of trade and financial openness as 
compared to conventional banks. Lastly, we use both accounting based measure (i.e. Z-score) and 
market based measure (i.e. Merton distance to default, DD) to test the impact of openness variables 
on the stability of banks. The results provide evidence that trade and financial openness reduce the 
stability of Islamic banks, while increasing the stability of conventional banks. 
This study contributes to the existing literature at least in two ways. First, we extend the 
literature studying the role of Islamic banks, at the macro level, on financial development and 
economic growth (Grassa & Gazdar, 2014; Hassan et al., 2013; Imam & Kpodar, 2016; Kassim, 
2016). More specifically, we test the openness theory proposed by Rajan & Zingales (2003) on 
Islamic banks’ profitability and stability at the micro level. Second, this study adds to the very thin 
but expanding strand of the literature examining the determinants of Islamic banks’ stability in 
comparison to conventional banks (Čihák & Hesse, 2010; Beck, et al., 2013; Kabir, et al., 2015; 
Albaity et al., 2019; Hassan, et al., 2019). In this regard, we unveil that a country which is 
simultaneously open to trade and capital accounts might observe the decrease in the stability of 
Islamic banks.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, 
providing also a theoretical framework. Section 3 describes our dataset, variables and econometric 
strategy. Section 4 discusses our findings and, finally, section 5 concludes this study. 
2. Theoretical framework and literature review  
A vast amount of literature assessing the financial development and economic growth nexus, 
mainly finds that financial development positively favors economic growth (Levine, 1997; Rajan 
& Zingales, 1998; Demetriades & Andrianova, 2004; Jedidia et al., 2014). If financial development 
is so important for economic growth, there are authors wondering why so many countries have 
underdeveloped financial systems (Rajan & Zingales, 2003). To answer this question, they propose 
an interest-group theory of financial development, alternatively known as openness theory. In this 
theory, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that both industrial and financial incumbent groups, cross-
border trades and capital flows are the main factors to influence the financial sector development. 
A developed financial sector creates opportunities for new firms to establish and grow, ultimately 




might discourage and oppose the financial sector development. The authors also suggest that the 
impact of the aforementioned group will be weaker if the economy is simultaneously open to trade 
and capital flows. In other words, trade openness without financial openness might result in 
financial repression and loan subsidies, with the consequence to provide cheap financing to 
industrial incumbents. Instead, financial openness without trade openness is more likely to give 
access to industrial incumbents to raise funding from external sources, probably deteriorating the 
profits of domestic financial institutions. 
Previous literatures mainly focused on the impact of trade and financial openness on economic 
growth at macro level (Law, 2008;2009; Baltagi et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2010; Herwartz & Walle, 
2014; Menyah et al., 2014; Muhammad et al., 2016;) and micro level, using bank-level data 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti & Hardy, 2005; Denizer et al., 2007; Hermes & Nhung, 2010; Zhang et al., 
2015; Luo et al., 2016; Bremusa & Buch, 2017; Ashraf, 2018; Aluko & Ajayi, 2018). 
Law (2008) investigates the impact of trade and financial openness on financial development 
in Malaysia, using the bound testing approach. He finds that both trade and financial openness 
positively spur the financial development but no evidence is provided for the simultaneous effect 
of trade and financial openness on financial development. In another study, this simultaneous 
effect is a positive significant determinant of financial development for developing countries (Law, 
2009). 
Baltagi et al. (2009) assess the role of trade and financial openness on financial development in 
industrialized and developing countries, finding that both variables have a significant impact on 
financial development. Furthermore, they also provide evidence that the marginal effect of trade 
openness is negatively related to financial openness and vice versa. Kim et al. (2010) find that 
financial development and trade openness are complements in the long run and substitutes in the 
short run. 
Herwartz & Walle (2014) argue that the impact of financial development on economic growth 
depends on the level of openness of a country in terms of trade and capital accounts. By using a 
comprehensive dataset of 78 countries for 1981-2006, they find an inverse impact of financial 
openness on finance-growth nexus and positive for the trade openness. More specifically, a higher 




while trade openness enhances this relationship. In a similar vein, Menyah et al. (2014) reject 
finance-led growth and trade-led growth hypothesis for 21 African countries. Their empirical 
findings suggest very limited support to the aforementioned hypothesis, which implies that trade 
and financial liberalization have no impact on economic growth. In contrast, Muhammad et al. 
(2016) find a positive relationship of financial development with economic growth in GCC 
countries but they do not consider the openness hypothesis proposed by Rajan and Zingales (2003). 
Considering the role of trade and financial openness at a micro level, Zhang et al. (2015) 
investigate the impact of trade and financial openness on financial development with three 
different indicators to differentiate the size, efficiency, and competition within the dimensions of 
financial development. They find that openness has a positive impact on financial efficiency and 
competition, but it’s negatively related to the size of financial development.  
Bonaccorsi di Patti & Hardy (2005) find profit efficiency to be increased for Pakistani banks 
immediately after financial liberalization but reduced in the following years. Denizer et al. (2007) 
also report the similar findings that banking efficiency for Turkish banks was reduced after 
financial liberalization due to serious macroeconomic instability in the Turkish economy. On the 
other hand, Hermes & Nhung (2010) show a positive impact of financial liberalization on banking 
efficiency in Latin America and Asian banks during the period of 1991-2000.  
Bourgain et al. (2012) argue that financial openness is indispensable and induces banks to be 
financially more transparent, keeping under control the risk management. Nonetheless, it increases 
the competition for financial institutions, potentially reducing the profitability. In this regard, Luo 
et al. (2016), using a comprehensive dataset of 2007 commercial banks for the period 1999- 2011,  
document the relationship between financial openness, bank risk and profit efficiency in 140 
countries. They find that financial openness reduces the efficiency of bank profitability without 
any change in bank risk level, while it has an indirect positive effect on bank risk level through the 
channel of reduced bank profit efficiency.  
Bremusa & Buch (2017) investigate the impact of financial openness and large bank on 
economic growth using a panel dataset of 79 countries for the period of 1996 to 2009. They find 




a negative impact on GDP growth. Moreover, granular effects are stronger when the economies 
are financially closed and concentrated.  
Ashraf (2018) tests the openness theory on emerging economies taking into account bank-level 
data of 287 banks for the period 2000-2012. He finds that trade openness stimulates bank 
development through increasing loan volume and lowering the cost and risk of the bank credit. 
Financial openness, instead, has a negative impact on the cost and the loan volume of the bank, 
being also positively associated with bank risk-taking. In fact, higher financial openness brings 
more competition to the economy, forcing banks to reduce the cost of credit; but for higher 
profitability, banks expose themselves to risk by extending higher loan credit. Surprisingly, the 
author shows that higher financial openness reduces the volume of bank credit. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
For the collection of data, we rely on four databases. We collect financial statement data using 
Bankscope and Bloomberg databases for the period 2007-2015 for the banks working in the GCC 
countries (i.e. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). For 
the data of trade openness and macroeconomic variables, we use the WDI World Bank database 
and financial openness data, collected from Chinn & Ito (2006). 
As we are specifically interested in the impact of trade and financial openness on cost, volume, 
and stability of banks, we incorporate only banks with traditional banking model of 
lending/borrowing (for instance, we exclude all banks having investment and corporate financial 
services orientation), using consolidated data where possible and individual data for the remaining 
banks. We eventually have a sample of 92 banks, comprised of 44 Islamic banks and 48 








Table 1 Sample description  
Country 
Name  
Initial Population    Sample Dataset    
  Islamic Banks  
Conventional 
Banks 




Bahrain 15 20 35 18 9 27 
Oman 2 10 12 0 6 6 
Kuwait 7 20 27 6 5 11 
Qatar 6 11 17 6 6 12 
Saudi 
Arabia 
8 10 18 4 8 12 
United Arab 
Emirates  
12 32 44 10 14 24 
Total 50 103 153 44 48 92 
This table contains bank population and sample data set, divided by bank type and country list. As observed from 
the table, initially there were total 153 banks which reduced to 92 banks, with 44 Islamic and 48 conventional banks.    
 
3.2 Measurement of Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent variables  
Keeping in mind the objective of the study, we incorporate the Net Interest Margin (NIM) as a 
proxy variable to assess the cost of banks, which is computed as the difference of interest income 
and interest expense divided by total interest-bearing assets. This variable measures total interest 
income received from the borrower and interest expense paid to depositors (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2004; Claessens et al., 2018). 
Since interest is prohibited under Shariah Law, interest income and interest expense should be 
considered as financing income (profit for Islamic banks from PLS, Musharaka and Mudarabah), 
cost-plus profit (Murabaha), lease based (Ijarah) mode of financing and financing expense (profit 
for the depositors mainly through Mudarabah) divided by profit-generating assets for Islamic 
banks. 
 For the volume of bank credit, we use a proxy variable of annual gross loans to total assets. 




of its total assets (Cole & Turk-Ariss, 2013; Ashraf, 2018). Table 2 presents the description of all 
the variables used in this study. 
Table 2 Main variable description  
Type Variable Estimation 
Dependent 
variables 
Net Interest Margin (NIM) (Net Interest Income /Total Average Earning Assets) 
Gross Loans to total assets (GLTA) (Total Gross Loans /Total Assets) 
Z-Score  (ROA + Equity/TA) / σROA 
Distance to Default (DOD) 
 
(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡) 






Trade Openness (TO)  (Import +export)/GDP 
 
Financial Openness (FO)  
Kaopen index which measures the level of capital account 
openness in a country.   
Size(Log_TA) Natural Logarithm of total assets 
Equity Ratio(ETA) Equity/Total Assets 
Deposits to Total Assets 
(Deposits_TA) 
Total Deposits/Total Assets 
Cost to Income Ratio (CIR) (Operating Expenses/Total Revenue) 
Non-interest income to total revenue 
(NONIITR)  
Non-Interest Income/Total Revenue  
 ROAA Return on Average Asset 
 
Non-Performing Loans to Gross 
Loans(NPLGL) 




GDP GDP Growth 
Inflation (Inf) Inflation (Consumer price index) 
Bank Concentration (bank_con) 
Assets of three largest bank/Total Commercial Bank 
Assets in a country 
This table describes the main variables and their estimation   
 
For bank stability, we use Z-Score, which is widely used in the literature as accounting measure 
of bank stability (Ashraf, 2018; Beck et al., 2013; Čihák & Hesse, 2010). This variable is measured 
as the sum of return on assets (ROA) and equity to asset ratio (ETA) divided by the standard 
deviation of ROA. A higher value of this variable indicates the higher level of stability for a bank. 
  The Z-score is calculated as the sum of the ROAA and the equity-to-asset ratio, divided by the 





Islamic banks, by their nature, have a large amount of investment account holder (IAH), with 
similar features of equity capital, but these IAH are not fully reflected in this traditional measure 
(Čihák & Hesse, 2010). Therefore, such an accounting base variable can lead Islamic banks to be 
professed as less stable. 
To account for this issue, we also apply a market-based measure of stability, i.e. Merton’s 
Distance to Default (DD), which is considered the best measure in assessing bank stability (Kabir, 
et al., 2015). The DD is traditionally measured as the difference between the market value of assets 
and a default point, defined as the sum of short-term and half of long-term liabilities, divided by 
the product of the market value of assets and their volatility. A higher value of this variable implies 
that the bank is more stable. 
For this study, we collect default probabilities from Bloomberg Professional Services and 
measure the DD by the inverse cumulative distribution function as follows. 
Let be a standard normal variable, where, the probability of default is defined as: 









  𝑑𝑡 








Equation 1 allows us to define DD from the probability of default, as follows: 
ɸ−1(𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) = √2 𝑒𝑟𝑓
−1 (2𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 − 1), 𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 ∈ (0,1)         [2] 
Due to data unavailability on this variable, we are forced to reduce the sample of this particular 
analysis to 21 Islamic and 35 conventional banks. 
3.2.2 Measurement of Independent Variables  
To assess trade openness (TO), we use trade to GDP ratio which is measured as the sum of total 
import and export divided GDP. This variable is widely used in the literature of economic growth 




For financial openness (FO), we employ the dejure Chinn-Ito index (which is known as 
KAOPAN index). This index is constructed based on the information available in the IMF annual 
report on exchange arrangement and exchange restriction (AREAER). More specifically, it takes 
into account a binary dummy variable, which codifies the restriction on a cross-border financial 
transaction. A high number indicates a lower level of restriction (Chinn & Ito, 2006). 
3.2.3 Control Variables  
Following the literature on bank cost, volume and stability (Ashraf, 2018; Claessens, et al., 
2018; Beck, et al., 2013; Čihák & Hesse, 2010), we also incorporate some bank-specific variables. 
We include the natural log of total assets (log_TA), the equity to total assets (ETA), the deposits 
to total assets (Deposits_TA), the cost to income ratio (CIR) and the non-interest income to total 
revenue (NONIITR). To capture the effect of the global financial crisis, we introduce a dummy 
variable crisis, which takes the value 1 if the year is 2008 and 2009 and zeroes otherwise. 
To control country-specific factors, we use gross domestic product growth (GDP) and inflation 
level (inf) in a country. Moreover, we include bank concentration proxy variable (bank_con) which 
is the share of three largest bank assets over total commercial bank assets in a country, to account 
for the possible effect of the banking industry on individual bank performance in terms of cost, 
volume and stability level (Ashraf, 2018; Zhang, et al., 2015). 
3.3 Econometric model  
We run a series of multivariate regressions to investigate the impact of trade and financial 
openness on cost, volume and stability of banks with the following static panel model; 
 
Y𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑂𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑂_𝐹𝑂)𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛿𝑀𝑗,𝑡  + 𝑖,,𝑗,𝑡                                             [3] 
 
The  Y𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 will take the alternative dependent variables, which are NIM, GLTA, Z-score and 
DD while (TO), (FO) and their interaction term TO_FO are the three main explanatory variables. 
CV and M are the vectors for the bank and macroeconomic country-specific control variables 
respectively. All the bank-specific variables are winsorized at 1% at each tail to mitigate the 




In order to choose between fixed and random effect model, we apply Hausman tests. which 
suggests the use of a fixed-effect model. 
 
4. Main Results and Discussion  
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 3, 4 and 5 present the descriptive statistics of all variables subdivided by Islamic and 
conventional banks. For Islamic banks, the average value of NIM is 3.021, which is slightly lower 
than conventional banks, implying that Islamic banks are less profitable. This could be due to the 
fact that Islamic banks have to be more prudent in order to be Shariah compliant and bear extra 
monitoring and controlling cost. The mean value of GLTA indicates that conventional banks have 
a higher share of client base with a higher amount of loans in their balance sheet. 
Considering the bank stability measure, we find Islamic banks to be more stable compared to 
conventional, implying that Islamic banks have better quality assets and are more resilient in the 
event of distress.  The mean value of Z-score, which is an accounting based measure, is 7.518 for 
Islamic while the same variable has the mean value of 4.013 for conventional banks. On the other 
hand, the mean value of DD is 3.279 and 3.277 for Islamic and conventional banks respectively. 
Trade and financial openness are the country-level variables which are the same for both Islamic 
and conventional banks. The mean value of TO is 131.68, while FO has the mean value of 2.01. 
Considering the bank-specific variables, the mean value of ROAA, log_TA, and deposits_TA 
confirms our earlier finding that Islamic banks are less profitable and smaller in size compared to 
conventional banks. However, Islamic banks have higher dependency on non-interest income 
activities with the mean value of NIIGR 44.714. The non-performing loans are also higher in 
Islamic banks compared to conventional banks with the mean value of 8.44.  Furthermore, Islamic 
banks, on average, have an equity asset ratio of 29.891 which is higher as compared to convention 
banks with an average equity ratio of 14.936. While the cost to income ratio is higher for Islamic 
banks, which could be due to unexploited scale of economies and higher monitoring cost. Our 





Table 3 Descriptive statistics: All banks 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
NIM 739 3.102 3.143 -4.48 62.22 
GLTA 712 58.86 18.772 1.619 102.247 
 Z_score 739 5.507 5.601 -2.843 46.188 
DD 505 3.272 0.511 1.649 5.306 
ROAA 739 1.766 3.609 -31.15 31.95 
ETA 739 21.31 20.093 0.77 99.78 
 Deposits_ta 663 62.454 18.489 0.139 84.583 
 log_ta 739 22.59 1.702 16.309 25.72 
NIIGR 739 37.137 27.794 -63.35 362.28 
NPLGL 637 5.786 9.246 0 100 
CIR 739 48.374 38.211 9.09 393.99 
TO 739 131.941 40.039 72.353 196.429 
FO 739 2.021 0.562 1.082 2.374 
GDP 739 4.509 4.2 -7.076 19.592 
INF 739 3.444 3.376 -4.863 15.05 
 Bank_concentration 739 70.238 11.342 49.485 89.313 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of all banks. Net Interest Margin (NIM), Gross loans to Total 
assets (GLTA), Zscore (Z-score) and Merton distance to default (DD) are dependent variables. Trade 
openness  (TO) and Financial Openness (FO) are the main explanatory variables while bank-specific 
variables include return on assets (ROA),Equity to total assets (ETA), deposit to total assets 
(Deposits_TA), log of total assets (log_TA), Non-interest income to gross revenue (NIIGR), Non-
performance loans to gross loans,  cost to income ratio (CIR),  and growth of gross domestic product 
(GDP), inflation (Inf) and bank concentration (Bank_concentration)  are the macroeconomic variables 
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics: Islamic banks 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
NIM 315 3.021 4.506 -4.48 62.22 
GLTA 294 53.744 23.926 1.619 99.316 
 Z_score 315 7.518 7.513 0.752 46.188 
DD 181 3.265 0.563 1.737 5.306 
ROAA 315 1.586 5.129 -31.15 31.95 
ETA 315 29.891 27.076 6.34 99.78 
 Deposits_ta 251 58.697 23.745 0.139 84.583 
 log_ta 315 21.84 1.785 16.309 25.156 
NIIGR 315 44.714 38.153 -63.35 362.28 
NPLGL 223 8.441 14.04 0 100 




This table presents the descriptive statistics of all banks. Net Interest Margin (NIM), Gross 
loans to Total assets (GLTA), Zscore (Z-score) and Merton distance to default (DD) are 
dependent variables. Trade openness  (TO) and Financial Openness (FO) are the main 
explanatory variables while bank-specific variables include return on assets (ROA), Equity 
to total assets (ETA), deposit to total assets (Deposits_TA), log of total assets (log_TA), 
Non-interest income to gross revenue (NIIGR), Non-performance loans to gross loans,  cost 
to income ratio (CIR). Country specific variables are the same as in Table 3. 
 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics: Conventional banks 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
NIM 424 3.162 1.47 -3.45 10.33 
GLTA 418 62.459 12.931 14.604 102.247 
 Z_score 424 4.013 2.755 -2.843 26.926 
DD 324 3.276 0.481 1.649 5.177 
ROAA 424 1.899 1.778 -16.16 18.04 
ETA 424 14.936 8.038 0.77 99.78 
 Deposits_ta 412 64.742 13.919 0.436 82.585 
 log_ta 424 23.147 1.4 17.284 25.72 
NIIGR 424 31.508 13.88 -44.65 158.33 
NPLGL 414 4.356 4.453 0.05 30.33 
CIR 424 37.855 20.434 9.09 333.33 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of all banks. Net Interest Margin (NIM), Gross 
loans to Total assets (GLTA), Zscore (Z-score) and Merton distance to default (DD) are 
dependent variables. Trade openness  (TO) and Financial Openness (FO) are the main 
explanatory variables while bank-specific variables include return on assets (ROA), Equity 
to total assets (ETA), deposit to total assets (Deposits_TA), log of total assets (log_TA), Non-
interest income to gross revenue (NIIGR), Non-performance loans to gross loans,  cost to 
income ratio (CIR). Country specific variables are the same as in Table 3. 
 
4.2 Openness and cost of bank credit 
Table 6 presents the results of the impact of trade and financial openness on bank credit. For 
conventional banks, we find both trade and financial openness having a positive and significant 
effect on the cost of bank credit, while we observe only trade openness to have a positive and 
significant impact on Islamic banks. On the other hand, the interaction term of financial and trade 
openness (TO_FO) has a negative impact on the cost of Islamic bank credit. The result of 
interaction term suggests that marginal positive effect of both openness variable is negative, which 
implies that the more positive coefficient of FO is, the more negative effect we have of TO on 
NIM of the bank; on the other side, the more positive coefficient of TO is, the more negative effect 




There might be several reasons for this negative relationship, but above all, Islamic banks are 
smaller in size, have lower client base both on the assets and liability side of the balance sheet as 
observed in section 4.1 (Beck, et al., 2013; Čihák & Hesse, 2010). The basic essence of Islamic 
banks is to promote the culture of risk sharing through the profit & loss relationship but they are 
reluctant to participate in profit and loss sharing mode of financing due to moral hazard and 
asymmetric information issues. 
Table 6 Openness and cost of bank 
VARIABLES NIM 





TO 0.07** 0.14** 0.03** 
 (0.026) (0.055) (0.016) 
FO 0.35 1.75 2.09** 
 (2.395) (6.515) (0.909) 
TO_FO -0.03** -0.06** -0.01 
 (0.012) (0.023) (0.007) 
Deposits_ta 0.05** 0.05* 0.01** 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.005) 
NPLGL 0.05 0.08** 0.00 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.011) 
ETA 0.07** 0.06* 0.06*** 
 (0.031) (0.035) (0.014) 
NIIGR -0.04* -0.05** -0.02*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.005) 
log_ta 0.80 2.69 -0.23 
 (0.960) (1.756) (0.182) 
GTA 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
CIR -0.02 -0.01 -0.02*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.004) 
GDP 0.04** 0.14*** 0.01 
 (0.020) (0.049) (0.005) 
Inf -0.01 -0.01 -0.02** 
 (0.022) (0.075) (0.007) 
Bank-concentration -0.01 -0.02 0.00 
 (0.015) (0.060) (0.009) 
Constant -19.07 -65.14 3.29 
 (21.271) (40.744) (5.161) 
    
Observations 610 207 403 
Number of indexnumber 82 34 48 
Adjusted R-squared 0.41 0.57 0.49 
This table presents the effects of trade and financial openness on net interest margin of banks using fixed-effect 
model. Net interest margin (NIM) is the dependent variable while trade openness (TO) Financial openness (FO) 
and their joint effect (TO_FO) are the main explanatory variables. Banks specific variables are deposit to total 




income to gross revenue (NIIGR),  log of total assets (log_TA), growth of total assets (GTA) and cost to income 
ratio (CIR) while bank concentration (Bank_concentration), growth of gross domestic product (GDP) and 
inflation (inf) are the country-specific variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance codes: *** indicate statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%, respectively 
 
4.3 Openness and volume of Bank Loans  
This section presents the result of the relationship between trade and financial openness on the 
volume of bank loans. For conventional banks, we find a statistically significant negative impact 
of FO on the volume of loans, which suggests that banks, operating in financially liberalized 
countries, will have lower volume of the issued loan. Naturally, any entry of a new bank in a 
country will increase the competition and impact business activities of its competitor. Results are 
reported in table 7. 
For Islamic banks, the individual effect TO on the volume of loans is statistically significant 
and negative. But, the interaction of TO and FO has a statistically significant positive impact on 
the volume of loans. This interaction results suggest that the financial openness will have a positive 
impact on loan volume of banks at a given level of trade openness and vice versa. This could be 
true for Islamic banks since the history of Islamic banks is not very old, still in its evolutionary 
phase, and can more reap the benefit of trade and financial openness as compared to conventional 
banks. 
Table 7 Openness and Volume of bank loans  
VARIABLES GLTA 
  All banks Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
TO -0.34*** -0.46** -0.19 
 (0.112) (0.218) (0.122) 
FO -24.25** -27.13 -24.72* 
 (11.668) (20.155) (13.061) 
TO_FO 0.13** 0.20** 0.05 
 (0.051) (0.096) (0.055) 
Deposits_ta 0.14** 0.08 0.13* 
 (0.054) (0.064) (0.074) 
NPLGL -0.24** -0.34*** -0.01 
 (0.090) (0.077) (0.154) 
ETA -0.50** -0.82*** 0.27 
 (0.240) (0.200) (0.191) 
NIIGR -0.08** -0.11** -0.13** 
 (0.034) (0.046) (0.050) 




 (2.837) (3.561) (2.508) 
GTA -0.04** -0.05** -0.01 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.019) 
CIR 0.00 0.00 -0.07 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.071) 
GDP -0.16* -0.11 -0.25*** 
 (0.084) (0.172) (0.068) 
Inf 0.02 -0.23 0.15 
 (0.121) (0.330) (0.129) 
Bank-concentration 0.13 0.41 0.07 
 (0.128) (0.269) (0.163) 
Constant 271.54*** 342.22*** 174.84** 
 (73.199) (100.954) (66.055) 
    
Observations 610 207 403 
Number of 
indexnumber 
82 34 48 
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.45 0.26 
This table presents the effects of trade and financial openness on loan behavior of banks using fixed-
effect model. Gross loan to total asset (GLTA) is the dependent variable while trade openness (TO) 
Financial openness (FO) and their joint effect (TO_FO) are the main explanatory variables. Banks 
specific variables are deposit to total assets (Deposits_TA), Non-Performing loans to gross loans 
(NPLGL), Equity to total assets (ETA), Non-interest income to gross revenue (NIIGR), log of total 
assets (log_TA), growth of total assets (GTA) and cost to income ratio (CIR) while bank 
concentration (Bank_concentration), growth of gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation (inf) are 
the country-specific variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance codes: *** indicate statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%, respectively 
 
4.4 Openness and Bank Stability  
In this section, we examine the impact of openness on the level of bank stability. Considering 
both variables of bank stability measures, Z-score and Merton’s DD, we find some contrasting 
results for both the banking business models. Table 8 presents the results of openness and bank 
stability. 
For Islamic banks, FO has a statistically significant negative impact on bank stability when we 
employ Z-score as the dependent variable, while we observe no effect of interaction-term. We 
observe a similar pattern for conventional banks. However, the results of market-based measure 
of stability, i.e. Merton distance to default (DD), suggests some difference in terms of effect of 
trade and financial openness on Islamic and conventional banks. We find the positive impact of 
trade openness on stability of Islamic banks, while the interaction term TO_FO has a negative 




profitability is the major objective of a bank manager, it might motivate the managers to take more 
risk by extending more loans, which will result in higher volatility of ROA, thereby, decreasing 
the stability of banks.   
On the other hand, the individual impact of TO and FO is negative for conventional banks while 
interaction term TO_FO exhibits a positive relationship. Conventional banks are large in size with 
a higher client base, as confirmed from the results of descriptive statistics, therefore, they are in 
better position to reap the benefits if a country is simultaneously open to both trade and financial 
openness.  
This contrasting result of z-score and DD is due to the difference in methodological approaches 
to estimate these variables. Therefore, one must give emphasis on the selection of variables while 
assessing bank stability (Kabir et al., 2015; Abuzayed et al.2018)). 
Table 8 Openness and Bank stability  
VARIABLES Z_score DD 










TO -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03** -0.02** 
 (0.027) (0.061) (0.021) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) 
FO -9.43** -11.87* -1.31 -1.35* 0.25 -3.06*** 
 (4.013) (6.006) (3.044) (0.702) (0.999) (1.045) 
TO_FO 0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** 0.01** 
 (0.013) (0.026) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
ROAA 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.28*** -0.00 -0.01 0.05 
 (0.066) (0.076) (0.081) (0.016) (0.018) (0.044) 
ETA 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.01 
 (0.023) (0.033) (0.031) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) 
NIIGR -0.00 -0.00 0.02* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
log_ta 0.30 0.56 0.95 0.23* 0.27* 0.13 
 (0.459) (0.887) (0.639) (0.133) (0.153) (0.192) 
GTA -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
CIR -0.01** -0.01* 0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
GDP -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.013) (0.031) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) 
Inf -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.02** 0.02 0.01 
 (0.023) (0.071) (0.019) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) 
Bank-
concentration 
-0.04* -0.07 0.02 -0.01* -0.00 -0.02* 
 (0.025) (0.086) (0.018) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) 
Constant 13.52 12.58 -21.88 1.23 -4.10 7.55 




       
Observations 715 301 414 492 175 317 
Number of 
indexnumber 
92 43 49 60 23 37 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.73 0.74 0.86 0.48 0.54 0.47 
This table presents the effects of trade and financial openness on stability of banks using fixed-effect model. Z-score 
(Zscore) and Merton distance to default (DD) are the dependent variables while trade openness (TO) Financial openness 
(FO) and their joint effect (TO_FO) are the main explanatory variables. Banks specific variables are return on average 
assets (ROAA), Equity to total assets (ETA), Non-interest income to gross revenue (NIIGR),  Log of total assets (log_TA), 
growth of total assets (GTA) and Cost to income ratio (CIR) while bank concentration (Bank_concentration), Growth of 
gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation (inf) are the country-specific variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance codes: *** indicate statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%, respectively 
 
4.5 Robustness checks  
We applied two different robustness checks. First, due to higher monetary and controlling checks, 
Islamic banks usually face higher costs to execute their operations. Therefore, it is interesting to 
investigate if trade and financial openness have a similar impact on cost, loan behaviour and 
stability of banks. In this regard, we split our sample of Islamic banks with cost to income (CIR) 
above the median value. Our results (reported in table 9) remain consistent with the main findings, 
with some insignificant variables, but the coefficient signs remain the same. 
Table 9 Openness impact on Banks with cost-income ratio above the median value  
VARIABLES NIM GLTA Z_score DD 
          
TO 0.08 -1.23 -0.07 0.03** 
 (0.064) (0.959) (0.115) (0.011) 
FO 6.29*** -13.20 -26.32 1.08 
 (2.062) (43.021) (15.593) (1.247) 
TO_FO -0.03 0.49 0.05 -0.01 
 (0.027) (0.392) (0.053) (0.005) 
Deposits_ta 0.03*** 0.13   
 (0.008) (0.112)   
NPLGL -0.02*** -0.15***   
 (0.006) (0.048)   
ROAA   0.26*** 0.07*** 
   (0.087) (0.021) 
ETA 0.02* -0.75** 0.21*** 0.03*** 
 (0.009) (0.274) (0.042) (0.004) 
NIIGR -0.02*** -0.12** -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.003) (0.044) (0.011) (0.001) 
log_ta -0.12 2.95 -0.00 0.20 




GTA -0.00* -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.001) (0.022) (0.009) (0.001) 
GDP 0.07** -0.14 0.07 0.03 
 (0.029) (0.443) (0.104) (0.023) 
Inf -0.09*** 0.10 -0.39** 0.01 
 (0.026) (1.035) (0.181) (0.047) 
Bank-concentration -0.00 1.69* 0.06 -0.01 
 (0.061) (0.982) (0.279) (0.024) 
Constant -8.69 -38.93 44.36 -4.28 
 (10.994) (180.317) (27.930) (4.018) 
     
Observations 90 90 148 76 
Number of indexnumber 25 25 34 16 
Adjusted R-squared 0.71 0.58 0.74 0.71 
This table presents the effects of trade and financial openness on cost, loan behavior and stability of banks using 
fixed effect model. Net interest margin (NIM), Gross loan to total asset,  Z-score (Zscore) and Merton distance to 
default (DD) are the dependent variables while trade openness (TO) Financial openness (FO) and their joint effect 
(TO_FO) are the main explanatory variables. Banks specific variables are deposit to total assets (Deposits_TA), 
Non-performing loans to gross loans, Return on average assets (ROAA), Equity to total assets (ETA), Non interest 
income to gross revenue (NIIGR),log of total assets (log_TA) and Growth of total assets while bank concentration 
(Bank-concentration), growth of gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation (inf) are the country-specific 
variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance codes: *** indicate statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%, respectively 
 
Second, we might have endogeneity issues in the data. For example, banks with higher capital 
ratios might attract deposit at a lower cost and lend it at a higher rate, affecting bank net interest 
margin. This is more crucial for Islamic banks since they have higher capital ratios. Therefore, we 
split the data of Islamic banks with capital ratios above the median value. Our results remain the 
same with respect to earlier findings, especially in case of NIM, as reported in table 10 
Table 10 Openness impact on Banks with capital ratio above the median value  
VARIABLES NIM GLTA Z_score DD 
          
To 0.39* 0.32 0.46 0.03 
 (0.209) (1.763) (0.409) (0.019) 
FO 17.51 34.54 8.17 -1.15 
 (28.672) (143.148) (25.567) (1.387) 
TO_FO -0.16* -0.15 -0.16 -0.01 
 (0.085) (0.722) (0.164) (0.008) 
Deposits_ta 0.01 0.56*   
 (0.021) (0.280)   
ROAA   0.31*** -0.01 
   (0.076) (0.022) 
NPLGL 0.08*** -0.26**   




NIIGR -0.08*** 0.11 -0.00 -0.01** 
 (0.015) (0.073) (0.015) (0.003) 
log_ta 4.55** 6.25 -3.77* -0.50* 
 (1.864) (8.632) (1.909) (0.281) 
GTA 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.005) (0.047) (0.011) (0.001) 
CIR 0.03  -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.020)  (0.009) (0.002) 
GDP 0.17** 1.04** 0.13 -0.03 
 (0.074) (0.438) (0.077) (0.017) 
Inf -0.14 0.84 0.01 0.04** 
 (0.176) (0.763) (0.131) (0.014) 
Bank-concentration 0.13 -0.15 -0.19 -0.02 
 (0.118) (0.957) (0.139) (0.021) 
Constant -141.30 -196.29 71.30 17.28** 
 (103.057) (507.420) (97.672) (8.162) 
     
Observations 67 67 147 101 
Number of indexnumber 20 20 31 19 
Adjusted R-squared 0.81 0.45 0.71 0.49 
This table presents the effects of trade and financial openness on cost, loan behavior and stability of banks 
using fixed effect model. Net interest margin (NIM), Gross loan to total asset,  Z-score (Zscore) and Merton 
distance to default (DD) are the dependent variables while trade openness (TO) Financial openness (FO) and 
their joint effect (TO_FO) are the main explanatory variables. Banks specific variables are deposit to total 
assets (Deposits_TA), Non-performing loans to gross loans, Return on average assets (ROAA), Non interest 
income to gross revenue (NIIGR),log of total assets (log_TA), Growth of total assets and cost to income ratio 
(CIR) while bank concentration (Bank-concentration), growth of gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation 
(inf) are the country-specific variables. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance codes: *** indicate statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%, respectively 
 
5. Conclusion 
Over the last two decades, Islamic finance has rapidly increased and has its strong and 
significant presence not only in GCC countries but also around the globe including non-Muslim 
countries. This phenomenon called for the evaluation of this sector and its impact on overall 
financial development and the real economy. The main objective of this paper is to evaluate the 
role of trade and financial openness on financial development by using micro-level data of both 
Islamic and conventional banks for the period of 2007-2015. 
Our analysis shows that the simultaneous openness of GCC countries to trade and capital 
accounts reduces the profitability of Islamic banks. This is arguably true since Islamic banks are 




of asymmetric information and moral hazards in such contracts. Moreover, we find that trade and 
financial openness increase the volume of loans but reduce the stability of Islamic banks. 
This study has several implications. It extends the ongoing debate on the role of trade and 
financial openness in financial development and contributes to the growing literature dealing with 
the impact of Islamic banks on economic growth. Additionally, the results of this study call for 
reforms in the Islamic finance industry. More specifically, the negative impact of trade and 
financial openness on the profitability of Islamic banks is against Islamic finance theories and 
practices. If Islamic banks have the equity participation mode of financing also on their asset side 
of the balance sheet, it will not only increase the overall profitability but will also increase 
resilience capability of Islamic banks to absorb losses during bad times which will protect the 
economy from the recession at the country level. Therefore, these results are of interest to 
regulators, policymakers and particularly for Islamic banks to adopt and bring innovative 
partnership-based products in their overall portfolio.  
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